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The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It 
AMYL. WAX 
Differential group achievements in competitive spheres like business, 
government, and academia, in conjunction with professed organizational 
c�mm_itments to fairness and equal opportu
nity, fuel claims that unconscious 
d zscnmination operates widely in society today. But attempts to blame disparities 
by race or sex on inadvertent bias must be approached with caution in the cu
rrent 
climate. Many allegations concerning unconscious discrimination do no
t properly 
allege category-based treatment at all but rather target the disparat
e impact, or 
differential effects, of category-neutral criteria. Such impacts often reflect well­
documented "supply side" disparities between groups in
 human capital 
development, qualifications, and behavior. These patterns ar
e not most effectively 
addressed by focusing on unconscious processes, but r
ather by scrutinizing 
neutral practices for efficiency and social useful
ness and also by attempting to 
eliminate underlying group differences in the ability to com
pete for social 
rewards. 
Likewise, allegations of unconsciously motivated
 disparate treatment, which 
are based on the contention that race or sex play
s a causal role in social 
outcomes, should be scrutinized for alternative, n
on-discriminatory explanations
 
for observed disparities, including "su
pply side" differences between group
s. In 
addition, some disparities attributed to unconscious bias could j
ust as well be 
explained by old-fashioned "statistical" or "r
ational" discrimination, whic
h is 
also fueled by real, average, observa
ble differences in perform
ance by race or sex. 
In general, sweeping and categorical claims 
of unconscious discrimination are 
unwarranted without specific evidence that this 
process ts actually operatrng 
zn a 
given case. Such evidence is hard to come 
by. In many cases, supporting such 
claims requires excluding alternative exp
lanations-including "supp
ly side .. 
explanations-for observed disparities in group success. 
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The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It 
AMYL. WAX" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like other participants in this conference in honor of Charles 
�awren
_
ce '� seminal Article, 1 I am deeply interested in the problem of mequahty m our society--economic, racial, social and sexual. What are the sources of existing disparities, and how can and should we address them? These questions pre-occupy those assembled here today. But, as someone with a scientific background, 1 am wary of explanations that posit 
causal mechanisms for inequality and acutely aware of the difficulties of 
substantiating such claims. When the assertion is made-as it often is in 
discussions of inequality-that X causes Y, my first thought (and the 
thought, 1 hope, of any good social scientist) is: correlation is not 
causation. lf X causes Y, where is the proof? 
Of course the problems of proof and causation have been long­
standing features of anti-discrimination law from the very beginning. But 
in the wake of the work of Charles Lawrence and his acolytes as well as 
the growing emphasis on the role of unconscious stereotyping and 
inadvertent discrimination in many areas of social life, these issues have 
taken on renewed urgency. The focus on unconscious bias has not only 
highlighted many uncertainties regarding issues of causation, correlation, 
and proof for discrimination claims, but has also renewed old 
terminological confusions. Some of the issues raised are longstanding, but 
others are new and peculiar to the conceptual difficulties surro�nding 
claims of unconscious bias. Some of these have been addressed m my 
1998 article, Discrimination as Accident/ and much of what I say there is 
still relevant to the conceptual and terminological conundrums P?sed by 
unconscious discrimination. On the issue of proof, however, there IS much 
new water under the bridge, with an accumulation of empirical studies and 
new data, and renewed claims based on that evidence. . . . . . 
Before addressing the question of how unconsciOus . 
d!scnmJ�atJO
.
n 
claims-and discrimination claims generally-are substantiated (wh1ch
 1s 
the main topic of this Article), J want briefly to consider-and 1 hope to 
• Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Jessica 
Weiss for excellent research assistance. All errors are mine. . . . 
' 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Jd, The Ego, and Equal Prorecrion· Reckomng wtlh Uncon.rnous 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1 987). 
2 Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accidenl, 74 IND. L. J. 1 129 ( 1999). 
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clarify-a few key conceptual and terminological Issues that arise 
repeatedly in this context. 
First, I begin with the well-known distinction between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment results when a 
personal attribute-like sex or race-is taken into account to affect 
decisions or to influence how individuals are treated by others. By 
definition, a person's racial or sexual identity is causally-and necessarily 
cognitively-implicated in the decision-making process. For disparate 
treatment to occur, the decision-maker must at some point observe, or at 
least be mentally exposed to, information about another person's identity. 
Without that input, there can be no disparate treatment. In cases of 
disparate impact, in contrast, race or sex does not causally enter into the 
decision-making process at all. Rather, application of neutral criteria for 
decision-making ends up having differential effects on different groups.3 
The tried and true categories of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact, and the law that has come to apply to them, have not received 
universal endorsement. In particular, some have argued that covert, 
unconscious forms of discrimination fit uneasily within this scheme. The 
contention is that, because the old categories predate the rise of these new, 
subtle types of bias, present realities render them obsolete. My contention 
here is that this critique is unjustified and misguided. Properly understood, 
the categories of disparate treatment and disparate impact create
. 
a 
serviceable conceptual framework for analyzing all claims of bias in socwl 
life, whether deliberate or inadvertent, gross or subtle. Moreover, the old 
requirements for making out claims under these categories are still releva�t 
and should continue to apply with full force to discrimination that IS 
unconsciously motivated. 
With respect to defining or identifying disparate treatment, I argu.ed 
previously that there is no conceptual or theoretical reason to distinguish 
among decisions that are influenced by a person's racial identity on the 
basis of whether those decisions implicate conscious or unconscious 
mental processes or are the product of deliberate awareness or 
inadvertency.4 If, for example, a person treats someone differently-a�d 
adversely-because ofthat person's race, then that would violate the plam 
3 With respect to distinguishing disparate treatment from disparate impact, there are bo!derline 
cases that are not easy to classify. One such case is that of neutral criteria that are selected because 
they disfavor one group. Although how to categorize such a case is subject to dispute, som
e 
commentators have argued for regarding this as a form of disparate treatment because race or sex 
actually e?ters into the decision-making process. On the role of intent in disparate treatment a�� 
disparate Impact cla•ms, see, for example, Michael Selmi Proving Intentional Discrimmatwn. '[, 
Reality of Supreme Coun Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997); David A. Strauss, Discriminato'?' Jnten� 
a� the Tamm� of�rown, 56 U. CHl. L. REv. 935 (1989). While taking note of this possJbilJty, th d1scu�wn herem WJll not centrally be concerned with this borderline case. · See Wax., supm note 2, at 1 1 37-38 (explaining that trait-based disparate treatment can still occur even when the actor is unaware of being influenced by the worker's race or sex). 
2008] THE DISCRJMINATING MIND 983 
terms of Title VII o f  the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which forbids such conduct. That would constitute unlawful disparate treatment whether or n?t the actor is fully aware that another person's protected characteristic­his r�ce, for example-has influenced the decision. Although, as a practical matter, an actor cannot engage in discrimination without having "observed" another person's race, that observation need not be conscious. There need be no element of awareness that race is a factor influencing conduct. All that is required to satisfy the plain terms of the statute is that race be causally implicated. This can happen consciously or 
unconsciously. Thus, the statute itself does not limit its application solely 
to deliberate treatment "because of' protected characteristics such as race. 
This analysis also points to an important source of confusion 
surrounding the concept of "intent." The word "intent" in the context of 
discrimination law is both mischievous and misleading because it is 
ambiguous. It can be used to distinguish conscious from unconscious 
action. But it is also sometimes employed to differentiate action taken for 
a particular purpose from action taken despite that action's effect. 
Originally, the concept of intent was used in the law to express the second 
distinction-between claims of disparate treatment and those alleging only 
disparate impact. But it came to stand for the first distinction as well, 
leading to the erroneous conclusion that only conscious disparate 
treatment-that is, action deliberately based on a protected characteristic­
is covered by the terms of anti-discrimination laws. 
As noted, the concept of "intent" has frequently been employed to 
distinguish cases of disparate treatment-where the effect on rac1al groups 
was generally thought to be "intentional" or "intended"-and those of 
disparate impact, in which racial effects were a byprodu.
ct of other goa
.
ls 
and thus "unintentional." The word "intent" thus made 1ts appearance :n 
cases such as Washington v. Davis and its proge�y, where th.
e Court s 
refusal to entertain constitutional disparate 1mpact claim� was 
expressed-infelicitously and ultimately confusingly-as the reqwr_en:ent . . . . . b .. . 1· 1 ,,6 In light of th1s 1t IS a that actwnable d1scmrunatwn e mten wna · . . ' . 
mistake to cite the equal protection cases for the propositiOn that actwnable 
. . . . · d l'b ate In the wake of more d1scnmmat10n must be conscwus or e 1 er · . 
h 'bTty for unconscwus--or precise insights about t e poss1 1 1 . " . . 1"--d. t treatment and with careful attentiOn to the core unmtentwna Ispara e 
. . . '. . h t . te retation is role of causation in antJ-discnmmatwn laV.:, t a m rp 
unjustified Excluding unconscious discriminatiOn from �he c
ateg�ry of
f · · t an overly restnct1ve notwn opotentially actionable conduct mcorpora es 
the causal element of disparate treatment. 
5 000 2 (2000) That statute forbids certain types of decisions made because of 42 U.S.C. § 2 e- · 
race, sex, national origin, �tc. Id 237-40 (1976). 6 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
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Under the best reading of Title VII's terms, that statute covers 
unconscious disparate treatment. The equal protection guarantee should be 
read in consonance. For this reason, Washington v. Davis is best 
understood by leaving the concept of intent aside. That case stands for the 
proposition that the guarantee of equal protection only elicits heightened 
scrutiny for actions taken "because of' discrete protected characteristics. 
That is, it only protects against disparate treatment. Because disparate 
treatment because of race can be conscious or unconscious, such adverse 
treatment should be regarded as constitutionally suspect as we\1.7 
The second confusion that has produced considerable debate concerns 
how to define racial bias or prejudice. Philip Tetlock and Hal R. Arkes 
have addressed this question in a widely discussed piece concerning the 
significance of the so-called Implicit Association Test (IAT).8 As 
developed by Mahzarin Banaji and her colleagues at Harvard, the IA T 
measures the speed with which subjects associate negative words or 
concepts with images of people of different races. The association is 
thought to reveal unconscious processes similar to stereotyping or 
generalizations about groups. The contention is that people who more 
quickly link negative ideas to black faces and positive ideas to white faces 
show that they harbor unconscious negative stereotypes of blacks.9 
Tetlock and Arkes question whether the IA T is really a test of 
prejudice, bias or racism in the ordinary sense of those words. They point 
out that stronger and faster association of negative concepts with blacks 
will not necessarily spring from hostility. Rather, people might be aware 
of social stereotypes that they do not themselves endorse, or of 
demographic or social facts-related to black disadvantage-that they 
regret or believe society must correct.10 Neither of these scenarios 
suggests the type of animus usually associated with racism as commonly 
understood-indeed, quite the contrary. 
My view is that these observations, although valid and interesting, 
miss the point. The concern here should not be with the mental 
associations the IA T purports to measure. Nor does anything important 
7 Although conceding that the language of Title VII would permit imposing liability for 
unconsc1ous dtsparate treatment, I previously argued against applying the statute to permit such cl�tms 
l�rge�y on _:prayuattc grounds. Tne iogic of my argument extends to claims of unconstltut:cna! 
dtscnm�atwn 
_
as well. Although I do explore the considerable practical difficultieS of makmg 0� 
�consc10us btas clatms below, I do not again take up the normative question of the scope of antJ­
dtscnmmatlon habthty that was the focus of my previous work. See Wax, supra note 2, at 1 226 
(explammg the problems associated with detecting and remedying unconscious discrimination under 
antt-b1as laws). 
, _ � Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice. or "Would Jesse Jackson 
Fazl /he lmp!zClt Association Test?", 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 25&-59 (2004). . 
__ For more mformation on the lA T, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Kneger, 
lmph��t Bzas: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL  REv. 945, 952-53 (2006). 
Arkes & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 258. 
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turn on resolving the semantic debate surrounding the meaning of "bias " 
"prejudice," or "racism." Rather, what really matters, and what ought io 
matter to law, is whether people are treated worse because of their race--or 
other protected characteristic, such as sex-in the real world. Specifically, 
the
_ 
focus should not be on attitudes or sympathies, but traditionally on 
actiOnable discrimination. Once again, discrimination occurs when an 
individual is victimized by ill treatment that is causally linked to or based 
on a protected characteristic. 
The Tetlock/Arkes critique of the IAT suggests a crucial related 
question: whether it is proper to equate unconsciously biased mental 
associations with the tendency to engage in unlawful discrimination.11 
Surely the answer to this question is "no." Biased thinking and attitudes, 
and mental processing of stimuli and concepts, are not the same as 
unlawful discrimination. It is important never to lose sight of this 
distinction. Racial discrimination is not about mental states. It is about 
social results and the causal basis for those results. Discrimination, 
whether conscious or unconscious, is abhorrent because it yields Jess 
favorable treatment of persons of one race in employment, education, 
public programs, political power, and other social arenas. Such adverse 
treatment affects status and well-being and arbitrarily exacerbates 
inequalities between groups. 
On this view what matters is not the mental state, whether conscious ' . 
or unconscious. Mental states alone do not harm people. Adverse act10ns 
are what harm people. The key question is whether mental states gener�te 
discrimination.12 It follows, I think, that we should only be concerned
 w1th 
unconscious bias--or conscious bias, for that matter-if it can be sh
own to 
produce real-world discrimination in the sense of disparate_ 
treatmen� �s 
just defined.13 Biased cognition thus commands our attentwn
 only If It 
reliably predicts or can be linked to actual discrimination.. . 
But it is precisely in the matter of establishing tha� h�
k that_ studies of 
U · b. d th cla1·ms based on those stud1es
 m soc1al sc1ence nconsc10us 1as, an e . . 
and le al scholarshi , potentially get into trouble. Th
at connectton 1s too g p 
d d the hard work needed to show often assumed rather than demonstrate , an 
·t 11 ·t · too often left undone. To 
the extent that efforts 
1 -to actua y prove 1 -1s ft h lf h rt d d. · · t. they are o en a - ea e .
 
are made to tie bias to actual tscnmma IOn, 
. . I 1 Kang Troja
n Horses of Race, II R HARV. L. REV 
11 For such an opm;on, see, for examp_
e, 1erryb. .�rough !AT experiments and the proportional 14 · h nee of tmp tell JaS '" 89, 1514 (2005) (argumg t e prese II Kri t" A Lane et al. Implicit Social Cof<nilion and 
influence on real world behavior). See 
genera Y 5 10 · • 
Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (Z007)·D. . . 1.0n and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal 12 . h d Banks et al JscrJmmo I . . ·r . . Cf, e.g., R. R.Jc ar 6--87
··
(2006) (observing that "a mental state signifies h1as
 1 11 
Society, 94 CAL. L. ru:v. _1169, _II� Althou the concem with defining "bias" is a Sidesho
w. the 
consrs_tently produces dts
c
_
nmmatwn 
) .. a men�l state is of interest only if 
it actually produces, or IS 
baste tdea expressed here IS a sound 
one.
1 ld . . d. · · tion m the rea wor . rehably associated w1th, 1scnmma 
13 See discussion infra Part III. 
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The entire subject of proving unconscious discrimination is too often 
plagued with muzziness, imbued with wishful thinking, informed by 
political correctness, and oblivious to unpleasant facts. 
In proving that unconscious mental categorization causes 
discrimination, the key is to isolate the effect of a personal characteristic­
let's say race or sex--on the outcome of a social decision. It should go 
without saying that this necessarily requires excluding other possible 
reasons for how members of protected groups are treated. In this respect, 
the problem of proof for unconscious discrimination is essentially no 
different in kind from the problem of proving discriminatory disparate 
treatment of the old fashioned, deliberate kind. Because people rarely 
admit to taking race into account, conscious discrimination is often covert 
or hidden from view. Proving discrimination therefore comes down to a 
process of elimination. The key is to rule out other explanations. Although 
this methodological goal sounds simple and certainly has been a staple of 
discrimination law and practice for some time, it is too often ignored or 
slighted in discussions of unconscious bias in the service of depicting this 
form of discrimination as new, unprecedented, and revolutionary in its 
implications. But when it comes down to proving the actual existence of 
unlawful treatment, claims of unconscious discrimination present 
remarkably few novelties. 
To see this, it is necessary to consider how one would go about 
demonstrating unconscious disparate treatment-in other words, proving 
that someone's decisions have been unconsciously influenced by another 
person's race or sex. There are two potential approaches. 
The first is retrospective. Social life is replete with decisions that 
could potentially be based on a person's race or sex. The challenge is to 
identifY the panoply of other possible non-race or sex-based decision­
making variables, and to use statistical techniques and regression analysis 
to factor out their influence. The goal is to isolate the effects of 
characteristics like race or sex and to assess whether these traits actually 
made a difference to outcomes. The difficulties of this task are well­
known. It is no easy matter to identifY and measure the range of pertinent 
characteristics that might affect how individuals are treated. It is hard to 
demonstrate which factors decision-makers actually relied on and whether 
those actually made a difference to outcomes. 
The second approach is prospective: one can design experiments 1_0 
equalize non-protected factors that might affect how a particular person IS 
treated, while varying only that individual's race or sex. Because othe
r 
inputs into the decision are controlled, such experiments can show that race 
or sex "made the difference" to an outcome. As discussed more below' 
such experiments are often cumbersome, expensive, and hard to perfo_rm · 
Moreover, matching inputs is difficult even in a highly controlled settmg, 
and the laboratorv conditions in which these experiments are conducted do 
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not necessarily have significant application to the real world. 
. Part II of �his Article will discuss some real-world situations that give nse to allegatwns of unconscious group-based bias. It will address the challenge
. of substantiating those claims based on the analysis of retrospective data. In Part III, this Article will examine social and laboratory experiments designed to determine whether social decision­making is infected by unconscious group-based generalizations. It will critically analyze attempts to link such evidence to legally actionable discriminatory treatment. 
II. RETROSPECTIVE CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
A number of large corporations-such as Walmart, Home Depot, 
Shoney's, Texaco, Coca-Cola, and FedEx-have been the targets of large­
scale anti-discrimination suits in recent years.14 In a related vein, the status 
of women in science and engineering careers has recently elicited growing 
concern. These trends stem from a common pattern: All too often, 
minorities and women do less well than white males in competitive spheres 
like business, government, or academia, as measured by pay, positions of 
authority, and advancement.15 These disparities give rise to accusations of 
discrimination. Yet the accused companies or institutions typically deny 
that they harbor any bias, and strenuously profess their deepest 
commitment to equal opportunity, fair procedure, and neutral criteria. 
Many expend considerable time and effort rooting out any traces of 
discrimination, even to the point of engaging the services of professional 
"diversity consultants" to scrutinize and revise their personnel practices. 
The juxtaposition of denials of discriminatory motive with differen�ial 
group results leads directly to claims of unconscious bias. The contentiOn 
is that, although these social actors may sincerely believe th:: are 
scrupulously evenhanded and committed wholeheartedly_ to e�ual 
opportunity," they are wrong! They may not realize it, but the1r operatiOns 
are riddled with racism or sexism. . . 
Unfortun ately, such loose talk is often marked b� sweepmg claims that 
are oblivious to the methodological difficulties and mtell�ctual _chall_
enges 
of substantiating them. Too many discussions of uncons�wus bias display · 1 · 'ble explanatiOns for observed a wholsesale d1sregard for a temat1ve possi . . 
group disparities. In addition, attributions of unconsciOus b1as too 
C D · ·ry and the Elusive Goal or Workplace Reform. 49 14 S N Le ·• Mega- ases 1vers1 , 'J ee, e.g., ancy VI" , . t t 1 3) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ B.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscnp 
: -10' ent discrimination cases involving large papers.cfm?abstract_id== I 017539 ( d iscussm�r r;; n C;�p r::: Policy on Women and People of Color. 7 corporatiOns)· Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact 01 · · po 
1. GENDER, �CE &JUST. 213, 223-Z4 (2()()3). 
FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, WoMEN'S 15 y CAIAZZA ET AL., INSTITUTE See, e.g., AM . WIDE DISPARITIES BY RACE, ETHNICITY, AND REGION l. 6. ECONOMIC STATUS fN THE STATES.
available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf!R260.pdf. 
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frequently conflate theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment. 
Complaints about seemingly neutral protocols that affect groups differently 
are coupled with accusations that otherwise similar or similarly qualified 
individuals are treated worse because of their identity .  This conflation is 
often accompanied by a failure to think clearly about arguments 
appropriate to these distinct complaints. 
A. Race and Juvenile Justice 
To illustrate how distinct contentions come together and how problems 
of proof are approached in the context of unconscious bias claims, consider 
a piece by Olatunde Johnson that addresses the over-representation of 
minority youth in the juvenile justice system.1h The author's critique 
sounds in both disparate impact and disparate treatment, with contentions 
about unconscious and inadvertent bias interspersed throughout At times, 
the author seems to assert that similarly situated black youthful offenders 
are treated more harshly than whites. Here she looks at whites and blacks 
that match on particular characteristics: black youth are detained more 
often than whites even if they possess a comparable history of delinquency 
and have committed the same offense.17 The implication is that this 
differential treatment is unjustified. Since there is no good reason for these 
observed patterns other than race, she implies, then race must be making 
the difference.18 It does not follow, however, that juvenile justice officials 
know they are discriminating. They may sincerely believe they are fair 
and even-handed and may be unaware that they are treating black youth 
more severely. Nonetheless, officials are likely influenced by stereotypes 
and generalizations about black youthful offenders. Although these 
allegations amount to claims of unconscious bias, they sound in disparate 
treatment 
Elsewhere the author broadens her focus to acknowledge that observed 
racial disparities might be due, at least in part, to the use of a broad range 
of neutral criteria! that go beyond the narrow characteristics of the offender 
and offense at issue.19 Officials may base their disposition decisions on 
background factors that are thought to correlate with recidivism and danger 
�o th� co:nrnunity. But application of these established procedures results 
m mm?nty youth receiving harsher treatment than whites. They are more 
often mcarcerated or detained and less often released to their family's 
custody and supervision. The criteria at issue are race neutral but operate 
to the disadvantage of blacks. Claims about unconscious bi�s come into 
16 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM L REv 374 379 (2007). 17 /d. at 403-{)4. · · · ' 
18 See _id. a� 383 (suggesting that black offenders "are given harsher, more restrictive dispositi��s than are theu wh1te counterparts when contro111· ng fior rei c h th ..- comm1tted ). 
19 /d. at 404-0S. ' evant 1actors sue as e o11ense 
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play here, too. Johnson's contention seems to be that such seemingly neutral structures are created and perpetuated at least in part because p�opl� welcome, or at least are indifferent to, the differential impact on mmonty populations.20 In this, she takes some inspiration from Charles Lawrence and others in advancing something akin to a negligence theory. 
�lth?ugh these contentions are open to interpretation/' they mainly sound m disparate impact. Such disparate impact claims-which focus on the differential group effects of neutral criteria-are distinct and conceptually different from claims of disparate treatment, which are directed at decisions taken because of race. 
In neither case, however, is the unconscious element the crux of the 
matter. Rather, the key issues are familiar. Is the system defective in the 
ways Professor Johnson contends? What should be done about it? 
Consider the charge of disparate impact. In a laudable burst of candor, 
Johnson concedes that the practice of weighing such factors as family 
background, neighborhood of origin, and available social supports in 
deciding whether to detain or release juvenile offenders operates to the 
disadvantage of minority youth. Black youthful offenders are more likely 
to come from single parent homes. Their parents may, on average, be less 
able to offer adequate support and supervision to wayward children. In 
addition, given their socio-demographic situation, black offenders' parents 
may, on average, be more difficult to contact and less likely to show up for 
interviews.22 They may be perceived-or actually be-less willing to 
work cooperatively with the system. If these differences exist, black youth 
will indeed end up being detained more often. . . . 
Professor Johnson strongly suggests that this differential tm�act IS 
undesirable and should be corrected. How should this suggestw�. 
be 
evaluated? Her recommendation raises important normative and empmcal 
questions. On the normative side, the first step is to identify the go�!� of 
1 1 ·t ·mate On the empmcal the system and assess whether those goa s are egi I · . .  · . . · · fr rk advances legitimate side, the questiOn ts whether the existmg amewo . . . . · · · d. te impact will undenmne goals and whether cbangmg It to mimmize tspara 
important objectives. . ubl ic Clearly the central aim of the existing system ts to promote p ' ful · d · · sm Does the current safety by reducing the risk of youth reel IVJ · . . t 11 . ( n and supervision, ac ua Y system, with its stress on family . coopera _w d d fi detention to work to rnini:rrllze recidivism? Wtll changmg stan ar s or · · . · · :1 ,._ffpnders committing more reduce racial differentialS result 10 JUvenue v .... � •. t eater danger and crimes? Will this expose vulnerable commumtJes 0 gr 
ultimately undermine their interests? 
20 See id. at 382-85. · b. · 21 S 982 83 •or a discussion on this am ,gu,ty. ee supra pp. - 1' 
22 Johnson, supra note 16, at 405. 
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Critical to answering these questions is the process of validation. The 
challenge is to show that a neutral criterion is related to or predictive of a 
desired outcome. To this extent, there is nothing new here. The battle of 
validation for criteria with disparate impact has been a staple of anti­
discrimination law since the beginning. And that demand has little to do 
with conscious, as opposed to unconscious, motives or processes. Perhaps 
it can be argued that there is indeed something new: obliviousness to racial 
impact may enhance the risk that neutral rules harmful to minorities will be 
adopted without regard to whether they advance any valuable purpose. But 
even this argument ultimately rests on whether the criteria employed are in 
fact socially justified. 
In the case of juvenile justice, the key empirical questions are whether, 
and to what extent, differences in family background and cooperativeness 
actually predict recidivism. Will less restrictive dispositions extract a price 
in greater danger from youthful offending? But even if reducing the 
detention rate of minority youth would come at the expense of public 
safety, the question remains of whether the tradeoff is worth it. What is the 
magnitude of the gain relative to the loss, and how should costs and 
benefits be compared? Does it matter that the victims of youthful 
recidivism are likely to be members of minority groups as well? In the 
end, we cannot avoid wrestling with these tradeoffs. But adding the 
element of unconscious bias does not change the calculus. What matters is 
the bottom line need to balance differential racial impact and public safety. 
In that vein, Professor Johnson herself acknowledges that family 
cooperation and family supports may be relevant to the success of so­
called "diversion programs" designed to keep juvenile offenders out of 
detention?3 She nonetheless recommends that less weight be put on such 
background factors regardless of their potential predictive value. There 
are, however, no easy answers here. Depending on the actual facts, others 
might strike the balance differently. 
But what of Professor Johnson's claims of disparate treatment-the 
assertion that j
_
uvenile justice officials are treating offenders differe�tly 
because of  their race? Justifying this contention requires demonstratmg 
that officials are in fact relying on the race of the offender in determining 
dispositions. And the necessary showing is the same regardless of whether 
that reliance is deliberate or inadvel.-�-Len�l u �... .. .�, 1,4 AnP nrove such · �lUW VYVUl\.J. vu'-' t'-
reliance? Ideally, one would demonstrate that black offenders are treated 
worse than white offenders who are equivalent in all other respects 
pertinent to disposition. That is, blacks are given harsher sentences even 
whe� matche? on all the attributes and background characteristics th�J 
officials take mto account in deciding what to do with juvenile offenders.-
23 !d. at 405 _ 
24 In contrast with disparate impact, claims of disparate treatment do not depend on whether or n
ot 
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Obviously, this showing is not made merely by noting that blacks get h�rsh�r treatment. They may deserve harsher treatment, at least on the cntena that the system deems relevant. Likewise, it cannot be assumed that the populat�ons of white offenders and black offenders are equivalent overall. Specifically, blacks and whites could well differ on the sociological, behavioral, and demographic characteristics that determine disposition within the system. 
In fact, there is no reason to expect that the populations of black and white juvenile delinquents are similar in all pertinent respects-and good 
reasons to believe they are not. Various offenders may differ by race in 
family structure, family background, and neighborhood characteristics. 
Given what we know about the racial incidence of single parenthood, 
multipartnered fertility, educational failure, and unemployment/5 it is 
entirely possible that black delinquents on average come from less orderly 
and intact homes or lack a resident, known, or employed father. These 
characteristics are established risk factors for anti-social behavior. 26 
Likewise, blacks might disproportionately come from crime-ridden or 
gang-infested neighborhoods, be at greater risk for involvement in drug­
dealing, or have a close relative or father with a criminal record. Because 
these factors predict greater involvement in unlawful activity, black 
juveniles within the system may on average commit more severe 
infractions or have more extensive prior records than whites. But group 
differentials in predictive background factors could hold �ve� f�r blac� and 
white offenders with equivalent records who comrrut s1m�lar cnmes. 
Systematic socio-demographic disparities can make race an mdependent 
predictor of future behavior. 
That people do not come matched on all characte�stics other t?an the 
forbidden one of race makes proof of discriminatiOn more diffic_
ult. 
Showing that individuals have in fact been judged by race requires 
· . . b tr 11 · � r all other relevant factors. 1solatmg the mfluence of race y con o mg 1o . . 
This is easier said than done. Although the process of decldmg what to do . . . d dry ·t · not That offenders come W1th JUVemle offenders seems cut an , 1 IS · 
d d in many types and varieties, and from many diffe�ent ba�kgroun s an
 
. . . · blemat1c It IS hard to take Situations, makes individual compansons pro . · , 
the full measure of each person who has broken society 5 �les. Th
u
b
s, the 
d l.k sounds good m theory, ut 1s concept that like cases should be treate a J e 
difficult to apply in practice. 
. . . . 
. . icular non-racial criteria into account. That is, the quest
ion 
deciSIOn-makers are JUStified m t akmg part . . f yth. g the system should care about is relevant . · · redictJve o an 10 of whether decision-making cntena are p . d" ·mination because of race. Even if the other . . . . t b t not to provmg Jscn to JUStdying disparate Impac u 
d . 1 t to recid,·vism actionable disparate treatment . . . arb . ....,rv an 1rre evan • cntena actually relied upon are Iu�; 
occurs only if race influences outcomes
. 
· ifr p 999-1001. 
25 For discussion offamily structure and ra
ce, seem a p . 
26 See infra notes 44-52 and accompanymg text. 
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The fact of systematic group d ifferences makes demonstrating 
unlawful discrimination even more problematic, because rel iance on valid 
criteria c an mimic reliance on race. It is unclear what criteria j uvenile 
j ustice personnel actually take into account. Maybe o ffi c ia ls  give weight 
to characteristics l ike background, personal attributes, or individual 
behavior-but maybe they do not. Even if harsher treatment of black 
youth seems actuarially j ustifi ed based on their actual  behavior, that does 
not rule out the possibility that officials are discrimi nati n g  based on race. 
The reason is that race may itself be a val i d  proxy for, or predictor of, 
future dangerousness. If race c orrel ates with recidivism, for examp le, we 
can never be sure whether o fficials are engaging in "stati stical" or 
"rational" discrimination based o n  race-that is, rel iance on race where 
race is a valid predictor--or are in fact responding directly to neutral 
criteria that merely correlate with race.27 Using race in the decision­
making process-whether "rationally" or not-is un lawful disparate 
treatment, while using criteria that merely correlate with race is not . 
Nonetheless, these are difficult to tease apart, espec ial ly where information 
relied on may not be readily observable to social scienti sts or outsiders . 
Statistical discrimination----that is, reliance on race a s  a val id predictor-is 
notoriously hard to detect and eradicate precisely because it can create 
patterns that would be expected from rel iance o n  val id, neutral 
characteristics. 
Nonetheless, the observation that disparate outcomes do not 
necessarily mean discrimination-in the sense of disparate treatment based 
on forbi dden characteristics-should not be forgotten . That observation 
highl ights a reality that many do not want to face . Populati ons often differ 
in ways that might legitimately bear on bow they are treated by others . 
Specifically, there exist systematic behavioral d ifferences by race that have 
predictable social consequences. Once again, to show u nlawful disparate 
treatment, it is necessary to show that people who match in all relevant 
r�spec�s are none�he.
less treated worse. Where populations systematical ly 
drffer m charactenstlcs that bear on social outcomes this a tall order. ' 
B. Sex and Science Careers 
Similar points are in order regardino accusatio ns o f  unconsci ous 
gender bias in the realm of employmen� and c areers .  Consider, for 
example, this passage from a recent National Academy o f  Sciences report 
o? the. sta� of women in  sci ence: "It is not lack o f  talent (that causes th
e 
dispanty wrth men] ,  but unintentional biases and outmoded institutional 
structures that are hindering the access and advancemen t  of women."
28 
�: For references and discussion of "rational" discrimination, see infra p. 1 0 1 2  & n.83 . . COMM. ON MAXIMIZING TilE POTINTIAL OF WOMEN IN AC ADEMIC SCI.  & ENG 'G, NAT L 
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" 
_This . 
sta�;m�nt bears closer examination. In identifying 
u?m�entwnal b1as as a moving force behind gender disparities in 
scientific careers, the main focus of this statement is on institutional 
st�ctures. Conventi ons, procedures, and criteria for assigning rewards in 
sc1�n�e are suspect because they operate to impede women 's advancement. 
This IS a garden-variety disparate impact claim. As such, it raises the 
famil iar question pertin ent to such claims: do the criteria, conventions, and 
organizational dynamics at work-the settled ways of doing things-serve 
any useful purpose or advance valued goals? Could they as well  be 
different without any significant cost to scientific quality, output, 
efficiency, innovation, or anything else we value or care about? The 
National Academy of Sciences Report seems to suggest that these settled 
practices l ack validity-that they do not serve any important institutional 
or social purposes. Implicit in the critique of the current system is an 
attack on that system as arbitrary or unnecessary.
29 
This passage could also be read as asserting unconscious disparate 
treatment. The central contention here is that gender itself influences the 
calculus. Despite measuring up in every way, women are treated 
differently, and less well, because of their sex. Although the claims 
implic it in  the NAS statement (disparate impact and disparate trea
tment) 
are not strictly inconsistent-as both could characterize
 the system 
simultaneously-the y  are somewhat in tension. The fi
rst conced�s that 
women may differ from men-although in ways that h
ave no beanng on 
quality or productivity-while the second claim is 
that women are treated 
worse despite being the same as men. . 
The critical part of the NAS statement 
fo_r our pu:,r
o�es IS_ the 
contention that women's  relative lack of succe
ss IS due to unmtentw?al 
biases ." Here the concerns with unconsci
ous bias and evaluat1�e 
structures com� together. Ad hoc, subj ectively loaded, u�syste�atJc
 
· ·t " lleaitimate consideratiOn-methods for assessmg performance perm1 an I b' . · into the evaluative process. specifically, the sex of the target-to creep . . . 
How should this contention be approached?
 Assessmg 11 reqUires the �a:ne
 
. . . b
. the J·ob more generally. Abt ht
y, 
analysis as claims of 1l legtttmate tas on 
. 
1 
merit, productivity, work product, a
nd perfonnance are noto
nous y 
MED THE NAT'L AC
ADS., BEYOND BIAS AND 
ACAD. OF SCIS. ,  NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G, AND lNST :�CAD��IC SCIENCE AND ENGINEERIN
G I (2007) 
BARRIERS: fuLFILLING TtiE POTENTIAL OF WOMEN
 
[hereinafter BEYOND BlAS AND BARR IERS] .  d b th sh  to  make science more
 hospitable to 
29 For a discussion of the challeng
es pose �zf e puBe uore Like a Man THE AMER ICAN, Wh Can 't a rr oman m· • 
women, see Christina Hoff Sommers, Y ·can com/archive/2008/ITUirch-apri l-magazi
ne-
. bl 1 http-1/www.amen . . March--April 2008, at 3 I , avail a e a .· ( " ticizing the idea that women ·s success m 
b more-hke-a-m
an en 
contentslwhy-can20 1 9t-a-woman- e- th ") See also SUSAN PINKER. THE SEXUAL . . tb rules of e game . . sc1ence "depends on changmg e GAP (200S) (discussing how psychological gender THE REAL GENDER . PARADOX: M EN, WOMEN AND to choose and achieve in sc1ence). 
differences might  lead more men th
an women 
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resistant to precise measurement . Fair evaluation requires di fficult 
comparisons and the exercise of discretionary j udgment. As applied to the 
real-world workplace, the assertion that such assessments are tai nted by 
race or sex is easy to make but hard to prove or refute. 
Those who would challenge the use of subj ective elements in 
workp lace evaluations on the grounds of their vul nerabil ity to di stortion by 
unconscious stereotypes must offer an obj ective basel ine against which 
such distortion can be measured. Without such a benchmark it is 
impossible to show that like c ases are not treated al ike.  Rel iable measures 
of productivity or quality may be available if tasks are straightforvvard and 
amenabl e  to direct observation or precise quanti fication. But many 
modern j obs are complex and require the exercise  of d iscretion and 
judgment. There are no cut and dried criteria for productivity and no 
straightforvvard yardsticks for success. B ecause thi s  h obbles attempts to 
prove that bias is distorting the process as well as efforts to show that it 
does not, it matters who is required to bear the burden of proof. But this 
means that requiring compl ex organizations to prove that all personnel 
practices are objectively fair is a heavy burden indeed and even a formula 
for paralysis .  The demand also begs the question o f  what procedures will  
replace existing ones, and whether they can be expected to improve the . . 30 sttuatwn. 
Is there some way around thi s  dilemma? Purel y  obj ective measures of 
on-the-j ob performance are j ust not feasible for many j obs, or come at too 
great a cost to the effectiveness of the enterprise. The initi al hiring 
decision is potentially more tractable, if only because less information is 
avail able about workers at this stage and objective measures work as well 
as any. Such screening devices were once common ly used in  deciding 
whom to h ire. General abil ity testing, for example, i s  an effective-albeit 
i mperfect-method for selecting workers in a broad range of j obs, because 
general cognitive ability-{)[ the type measured on IQ tests-is the best 
known predictor of employee performance regardless o f  job complexity.
3 1  
Yet obj ective instruments that emphasize cognitive aptitude have long 
been attacked �or their disparate impact on some min orities and, in s�me 
cases, women. In the wake of these objections,  such screening devtces 
n .  � 3� s;e. �e:_�: ·  ��ue� ,R;����enstos.' The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law: "'+ '-AL. L. ru:. v .  1 •  I I-Lo tLVUO) (notmg the pitfalls of proposals for reforming workplace pracnces), Wax, supra note 2, at 1 139-42 (questioning whether efforts to identify and el iminate unconscious bJas wil l  actually prevent disparate treatment). 
3 1 See Mark Ke�an, �oncepts of Discrimination in "General A bility " Job Testing, 1 04 H�Y .. L. REV. 1 1 57 ( � 99 1 )  (discussm� general aptitude job testing as a suspect method of predictmg JOb performance), Frank L. Schmidt, The Role of General Cognitive A bility and Job Performance: Why 
There Can�ot Be a Debate, 1 5 HUMAN PERFORMANCE 1 87, 1 87 (2002) (noting the "overwhelming reseru;;h ev1dence showmg a strong link between general cognitive abi lity . . .  and job performance"). 
. . See Kelman, supra note 3 1 '  at 1 1 59, 1 240 (detai ling the group disparate impact of "general ab1hty" JOb testmg). 
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have been virtually el iminate? from human resources practice and replaced ?Y fa_ctors such as_ 
educatwnal credentials, job experience, personal mtervte"":s ,  and prevwus performance. Yet because some of these criteria are re!attvely ad hoc and subjective, they are also open to attack as potential ly vulnerabl e  to distortion by group-based stereotypes and biases. 
C .  Race and Employment 
As with sex, so too with race.  Although recent decades have seen 
steady pr_o�ess, there are stil l  pronounced disparities by race, especially 
for men, m JOb status, earnings, and rates of employment.33 These patterns 
have provided the occasion for decades of job discrimination lawsuits 
a?ainst public and private employers. Once again, the emphasis  is on 
dtsparate outcomes .  The notion that racial differentials are sufficient to 
create a presumption of discrimination in employment is a staple of legal 
doctrine and practic e  in this field. The traditional doctrine also provides, 
however, that the presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by a 
showing that observed differences reflect disparities in qualifications or 
performance. 
Longstanding understandings surrounding the significance of 
workplace disparities have come under pressure from the recent stress on 
unconscious motivation. Common job evaluation practices, it is claimed, 
are inherently vulnerable to unconscious bias .  Organizations must 
confront the fact that their practices are subject to distortion despite 
avowed commitments to equal opportunity and strenuous efforts to be 
evenhanded and fair. 34 Unfortunately, this rhetoric has tempted some legal 
s cholars interested in unconscious bias to treat mere possibil ity as 
established fact. That common organizational practices are, by definition, 
tainted has acquired the status of an unquestioned proposition. �nd 
accepting that proposition is seen to justify the inference that unconscious 
discrimination i s  the source-and the only source-of observed racial 
differences in the success of individuals within such organizations. 35 In the 
context of scholarship on unconscious bias, the tradition�} presumption that 
attached to racial disparities has thus m?rp�ed . 
mto a firm-and 
irrebuttable---conclusion: Unconscious discrimmatwn IS the sole source of 
33 S F. · Welch The Employment of Black Men, 8 J. LAB. ECON . S26, S27-S30 ( 1 990) ee, e.g. , IDIS , 
(analyzing census employment data). - �  � . ... . h rguments)· Susan Stunn Second 34 I B •nra note JU (uescn'-'!08 sue a • · See genera ly agenstos, sur 1 A roach 1 0 1  COLUM. L. REV. 458 (200 1 ); Generation Em loyment Discrimmatwn: A Structura PP • . . . 
p · · 
P 
Mitchell, Implicit Prejudice and Accountabdlly Systems What Must h1lhp E.  Tetlock & Gregory . . . . 7 RES ORG. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2008) (on ti le w1th Organizations Do to Prevent D1scnmma11on. ' · 
Connicticut Law Review). 
30 at 5-S (noting theories of how unconscious bias affects s See Bagenstos, supra note t ' 33 at 468-74 (labeling unconscious bias "second genera tion" workplace inequality); Sturm. supra no e • 
discrimination). 
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differential outcomes by race. 
This position is  seriously open to chall enge. Spec ifically, it ignores 
significant "supply side" differences by race.  The exp ectation of equal 
performance fails to grappl e  with the realistic possibi l ity, grounded in 
social fact, that workers from different groups may n ot perform equally 
well overall .  And this can be so even when workers have been hired based 
on similar credentials of the type often rel ied on in the empl oyment sett ing. 
Although conventional types of j ob screening methods would seem to 
create a pool of workers equally capable of performing the j ob, that i s  not 
necessarily so. As with juvenile j ustice and women in science, so with 
employment more generally: even with populations that are matched on 
many characteristics, group differences in workplace p erformance could 
easily emerge. 
The possibility of group j ob performance disparities based on so-called 
"supply side" factors is one of the verboten subj e cts, the unspoken 
elephants in the room, in u nconscious bias discourse.  Employees hired 
into i dentifiable j ob categories from different groups may not be similarly 
qualified and endowed with attributes that enable them to perform equally 
well on the job. Indeed, there is considerable social scienti fic evidence 
that, at least when it comes to race, they may not, at least for now, be 
equally endowed. 
The fol lowing hypothetical case scenario i l lustrates this point .
36 
Floret, Inc .  is a large nationwide distributor of flowers. The company 
purchases and arranges flowers, plants, and bouquets, and then delivers 
them to florists and consumers nationwide. As part of i ts  distribution team, 
Floret employs hundreds of truck drivers. The driver ' s  job is to del iver 
customer orders to the right place within the promised ti me frame. A 
premium is placed on accuracy, speed, safety, and efficiency. In pursuing 
these goals, drivers have discretion in planning routes and dealing with 
contingencies that arise durin g  the delivery process. 
How does Floret go about hiring drivers? The j ob qualifications are a 
high school diploma or G.E.D. diploma, or in l ieu of that, honorable 
discharge from military service. A valid tru�k driver' s  l icense and clean 
dri�ing record are required. A few years of j ob experi ence are also highly 
desirable.  A company personne l  officer conducts a bri ef interview and 
peru�es �h� na�es. of-but does not always personally contact-references provided by the JOb candidate. Candidates must disclose any arrests, 
�on:ictions, and prison terms, although not all brushes w ith the criminal 
JUStice system are considered per se disqualifying. 
. 
.36 This scenari� is modeled on an ongoing case with which the author is familiar. Because the 
tdentittes of the parties and the details of the litigation are confidential, the author has disgui s
ed or 
altered some aspects of the case. With respect to the basic elements of the argument, however, 
the 
account accurately reflects the facts. 
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Once drivers are hired, Floret regularly evaluates their on-the-j ob 
pe
_
rformance. Because some, although not all,  aspects of performance are 
fatrly transparent and c an be easily assessed, some evaluative criteria are 
obj ective. Drivers are rated on absenteeism, tardiness, number of orders 
delivered, errors in delivery, timeliness of delivery, and driving safety. But 
drivers are also rated on "soft" aspects of performance. Scores are given 
for c ooperativeness, responsiveness to direction, flexibility, teamwork, 
work attitudes,  abi lity to work independently, leadership, innovative 
thi nking, and the like. These measures are assessed by direct supervisors 
on the basis of observation and day to day experience. However, all  
dimensions are rated quantitatively in keeping with the best human 
resources practice .37 
Unfortunately, assessments of Floret drivers, according to these 
procedures, did not produce uniform results. Black drivers, who, l ike all 
the drivers, were overwhelmingly male, received lower average scores than 
whites and were more likely to be disciplined, laid off, or fired. White 
drivers were promoted to supervisory positions at significantly higher rates 
than black drivers and received more pay raises. In response to these 
differentials, the black drivers joined together to file an emp
loyment 
discrimin atio n  lawsuit against Floret. Even though blac
k drivers, on 
average, got worse marks on the objective as well as th
e "soft" parts of 
their evaluations, the plaintiffs decided not to challeng
e all aspects . 
of �he 
assessment process.  Rather, they confined their cha
llenge to the subJ ective 
measures as described above.38 Their co
ntention was that the very use of 
these "soft" criteria violated anti-discrimination 
laws becaus� ( 1 )  these 
measures have a disparate impact on black
 employees_
, :V1thout any 
showing that the ratinas categories are j ob rela
ted or predictive of actual 
0 
d · d.  ate impact-and (2) these performance-an argument that soun s m 1spar 
37 . . ediction vs Clinical Prediction: !mprovint: Whar See. e.g. , Robyn Dawes et al., StallS/leal Pr 8 HA�IORAL SCIENCEs· M ETHODOIJXi iCA I .  Works. i n  A HANDBOO� FOR DATA ANALYSIS rN :: ed� . , 1 993) (gathering �tud ies showing that 
ISSUES 35 1 ,  352-60 (G1deon Keren & Charles Le . . ·m1·zes the predictive vahd1ty and . . . . b. 0· or soft cntena 
ma�o 
ass1gnmg a quantitative value even to su �ec ve 
internal consistency of assessments). . . ·r · 1·s not sumrising in l ight of t
he fact 
38 . . b 11 the obJecuve en ena '"  Indeed, the dects!On not to  c a enge .th th ubjective ratings, a pattern that suggested 
that the drivers' objective scores correlated 
closely Wl 
b . 
�s 
Because the Floret plaint iffs dec
lined to 
that the subjective assessments were not SJ
gnificantly Ja
d. · · 1y be brought out in the case. . th f; ts would not or man . challenge the obj ecttve measures, ese ac . 11 orted in the human resources l l terature . th h'gh orrelatwn genera Y rep . . . . Th .  The Floret data mirrors .e J c d more open-ended subJeCtJve cntena. J S  
b . . 'fi bl a· .. ·os nfperfonn
ance an . h b. t .  etween objectively ven ta  e me " U-1 "  - ·  h cJ·ous bias li terature tnat sue ' su JeC 1 ve · tral  to t e uncons · correlation undennines the assumption, cen b d b ·ases . See H. W. Hennessey. Jr. & H .  John 
job evaluations are fatally distorted by 
category- ase 
A 
l . I Crirerion Specificitv and Srati.rtiral 
. . p rfiormance pp
rmsa . 
. . 
Bemardm, The Relationshzp Between 
e 
1 43 1 55 (2003) (concludmg that there IS only . . . . . 2 H M RESOURCE MGMT. • · t Evzdence of Dzscnmmatwn, 4 U · . . cificity is related to less adverse 1mpac " . th t greater cntenon spe · · · Diffi · the very shghtest support . . · a '') ' Ph ' li L Roth et a! . ,  Ethnic Group 1 erences rn 
against minorities, females, or 
older workers
A
' 
1 1. 
p
88 J APPLIED PsYCHOL 694. 70 1 -412 (2003 )  . A New Meta- n a  yszs, . Measures of Job Performance.. . of perfonnance). 
(analyzing objective versus subjectiV
e measures 
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criteria are prone to distortion-and indeed, are destined to be distorted­
by unconscious, race-based biases and stereotyping-an allegation of 
disparate treatment. The plaintiffs argued, in effect, that the very 
subj ectivity of the categories for rating drivers allowed unconscious biases 
to creep in and virtually guaranteed that blacks would be evaluated less 
fairly and more harshly than whites despite similar p erformance. 
In response to these allegations, Floret denied all charges. The 
company strenuously expressed its commitment to racial fairness, equal 
opportunity, and respect for diversity. It pointed to investments of time 
and effort in developing policies designed to reach out to and recruit 
minorities, achieve a diverse and culturally sensitive workforce, and 
evaluate workers in an even-handed manner. 
The Floret case has many features common to claims of unconscious 
bias. The employees were assessed on "soft" criteria, which are deemed 
vulnerable to distortion by unconscious stereotyping. Workers appeared 
similarly qualified at the outset, thus begging the question of why the 
system produced racial ly d isparate results . And the defendant denied 
discriminating against minority workers, pointing to elaborate safeguards 
designed to ensure an evenhanded process. In keeping with the dominant 
understandings in the legal scholarship on unconscious stereotyping, the 
plaintiffs argued that none of this really matters . Unconscious bias can 
b kn th . . 39 operate un e ownst to e operators, and despite thei r  best mtentwns. 
A company need not be aware that their processes are structurally infirm 
and discriminatory. Those defects will occur despite the company' s best 
efforts .  
Once again, the critical but tacit assumption underlying the Floret 
lawsuit is that observed racial disparities are due to discrimination. Once 
again, the problem with this inference is that it is  unj ustified. It  flies in the 
face of a substantial body of social science data documenting racial 
differences in "supply side" dimensions that bear on performance. As 
already noted, this literature supports a prediction that blacks and whites 
will not always perform equally well on the job, even when workers from 
these groups are matched on credentials that employers frequently use to 
scr�en and hire job candidates. Specifically, the data provides reason to 
believe that black and white Floret drivers will not perform equally well.  
Although the background information does not definitively resolve the 
question of whether there are differences in these particular drivers ' 
performance by race, it sets up a rival explanation to discrimination as the 
possible source of observed results. 
What social science evidence is pertinent here? Since Floret demands 
a high school diploma, one might ask whether all h igh school graduates are 
39 For insight into this point-<:ounterpoint, see Tetlock, supra note 23 .  
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equally qualified. Specifically, is there reason to believe that black and 
white  high school graduates, on average, differ on dimensions that 
employers might care about or that actually correlate with and predict 
performance on a j ob like driving a delivery truck for Floret? The answer 
is yes. First, the average black high school graduate leaves high school 
with significantly l ower academic-math and reading-skills than the 
average white graduate. As measured by scores on the National 
Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP), the average 1 7-year-old 
black student possesses the math and readings skills of the average 
1 3-year-old white student-a stark difference.40 Are these types of 
academic skills relevant to driving a delivery truck? Almost certainly they 
are .  As already n oted, a large body of empirical work indicates that 
general cognitive aptitude predicts job success.41 Although partly a 
function of native ability, such aptitude is developed through education and 
i s  strongly reflected in academic achievement. Plain common sense also 
suggests that basic reading and math skills are capacities that drivers need 
and will  draw on routinely. Drivers must read maps and delivery orders, 
plan routes, cope with traffic problems, interact with superiors and 
customers, accommodate last minute changes and demands, and deal with 
mix-ups and incomplete information. These tasks require the daily use o
f 
skills-both cognitive and non-cognitive-that contribute to, and
 are 
reflected in, academic achievement.
42 
In addition to measured differentials in skills and learning, there are 
other characteristics  of the populations from which drivers are 
dra� that 
would predict average group disparities in j ob performance
 .
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behavioral outcomes, including, but not limited to, school success. In 
particular, the setting in which children grow up c orrelates with many 
aspects of effective socialization and future behavior, and those effects are 
observed even for families with comparable income and parental 
education. For example, soci al scientists have documented that children 
from non-traditional families have an enhanced risk of problems in many 
spheres of life .43 Children living with single parents are s ignificantly more 
likely to drop out of school, experience unemployment, and have an out­
of-wedlock child themselves.44 They also have "lower educational 
attainment, poorer mental health, and more family instabil ity when they 
grow up.'.45 Recent research reveals that individuals rai sed in bl ended or 
step-parent families also are at risk relative to those from more traditional 
backgrounds. In addition to having lower educational achievement and 
completing fewer years of schooling, these persons experience relatively 
more behavioral and psychological problems and have less stable adult 
relationships.46 Indeed, children from blended fami lies fare no better than 
children raised by single or divorced parents.47 In sum, data from a variety 
of sources now strongly suggest that children growing up in settings other 
than traditional families are at a disadvantage.48 
How is this relevant to the Floret case? The traditional nuclear fami ly 
is much less common among blacks than other maj or American ethni c 
groups . Dramatic family structure differences by race are reflected in out-
43 See Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child 's Perspective How Does Family 
Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It? Child Trends Research Brief (June 2002). 
http://www.chi ldtrends.org/files!MarriageRB602.pdf. 
44 David T. Ellwood & Jonathan Crane, Family Change Among Black A mericans · What Do We 
Know?, 4 J. ECON. PERSPS. 65, 70 ( 1 990). 
45 Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second 
Demographic Transition, 4 1  DEMOGRAPHY 607, 6 1 1  (2004). 
46 See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, No EXCUSES:  CLOSING TH E RACIAL 
GAP IN LEARNING 132 (2003); McLanahan, supra note 45, at 6 1 1 ;  Moore et a ! . , supra note 43, at !-2; 
Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan , Father Absence and Child Well-Being.· A Critical Review, 
in TH�7 FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 1 1 6, 1 1 6- 125 (Daniel Patrick Moynihan et a!. eds., 2004 ). 
See, e.g. , KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEF ALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT 
MOTHERHOOD BEFO� MARRIAGE 2 15 (2005) (noting that "living apart from either biological parent 
at any pomt dunng ch1ldhood is what seems to hurt children"); Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, 
Family �trocture and Children 's Educational Outcomes: Blended Families. Stylized Facts, and 
Descnpt1ve Regresswns, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 6 7 1 ,  687 (2004); Sandra L. Hofferth, Residential Father 
Family Type and Child Well-Being: Investment Versus Selection 43 DEMOGRAPHY 53 74-75 (2006). 
48 d d . 
' , 
. In ee , a _PICture �as �dually emerged of the traditional nuclear family-consisting of two 
mamed parents hvmg w�th the�r shared biological children-as the "gold standard," or the most 
demable settmg for raismg children. A research brief by Child Trends sums up the scholarly 
consensus: 
[R]esea:ch clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for children, and 
the family structure th�t helps them most is a family headed by two biological 
parents m a low-conflict marriage. Children in single-parent families, children 
born_ to _unmamed mothers, and children in stepfami l ies or cohabiting 
relatiOnships face higher risks of poor outcomes. 
Mcx;r:
. 
et ;'-· supra note 43,  at 6. See also McLanahan, supra n ote 45, at 6 1 1 ;  Amy L. Wax, 
Tra lflona 1sm, PluraliSm, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 402-{)6 (2007). 
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of-wedlock birth rates, w ith 69% of black children now born t o  single mothers as compared to about 33% of white children.49 Indeed, there are few contrasts in social l ife as stark as the disparity in single parent families b� race, which exists across all income and education levels.50 Likewise, divorce rates are higher among blacks than whites-a gap that also cuts across all social c l asses.5 1  Additionally, multipartnered ferti lity-the practice o f  men and women having children by more than one partner-is signi ficantly more common among blacks than other American ethnic and racial groups, and is more likely among blacks to result in an extra-marital birth.52 
These trends, and the racial fault lines they reveal, indicate that blacks are significantly more likely to be brought up in single-parent, fatherless, non-marital, or blended families than whites. These patterns have 
prevailed for s ome time. To the extent these circumstances of upbringing 
are associated with lower academic achievement and higher risks of anti­
social behavior, impulsiveness, involvement with drugs, unstable personal 
relationships, and mental health problems, differences in family structure 
alone would predict that black men are more likely to experience those 
difficulties.  It would not be unexpected for the effects to spill over into 
performance on the j ob.  
There are yet other socio-demographic differences between b lack and 
white workers that c ould affect productivity on the job. Just as blacks and 
w hites have disparate family backgrounds, their adult family situations 
_
also 
fai l  to match. Over the past fifty years, marriage rates ha:e dechned 
precipitously among blacks, with the percen�ge of ad�lts marned,53
°r ev�r 
married, now by far the lowest among maJor Amencan groups. Thts 
trend i s  particularly pronounced among black men, who marry much less 
Am L W Engines of Inequality: Race. 49 See, e.g. , Ellwood & Crane, supra note 44; see also Y · ax, Class, and Family Structure, 4 1  FAM. L.Q. 567 (2007). 
.1 Lifi N y TIMES Dec. 9 5o . · s h f W. ighing Famt v I e, · · ' ' See, e.g. , Michael Wmenp, In Gaps at c 00 • e T file (noting that on ly 35% of black 2007, § 1 4LI, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
NYf Am . cht.Jdren overal l) . . . d ·th 68o/c o encan · chlldren currently hve w1th two parents , compare W1 ° 
d' R cia/ Dliffierences in Marital s 1  J 1 · A Ph 'llips Understan mg a See Megan M .  Sweeney & u Ja · 1 ' 
639 648 (2004). D . d I . 66 J MARRIAGE & FAM. , zsruption: Recent Trends an Exp anatwns, · 
be J Multipartnered Fertiliry Amon!( 52 See e.g. Karen Benjamin Guzzo & Frank F. Fursten rg, r.t, 49 . ' , 9 1  92 (2007)· Wax, supra no e . . . A mencan Men, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 583, 5 - • 
6�9 (documenting and discusstng ractal 53 See, e.g. ,  Ellwood & Crane, supra note 
��\ her Winship, Socioeconomic Chanf(e and differentia ls in marriage rates); Robert D. Mare & 
TH 
s 
��BAN UNDERCLASS 1 75, 1 75 (Chnstopher the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whtte�, m 
Kel� Raley, Recent Trends and Differenrials �n Jenks & Paul E. Peters�n eds., 1 99 1 )  
(sm;';>·i:THE T�ES THAT B!ND: PERSPECTIVE� ?N .M�-��AC:t Mamage and Cohabllatwn: The Unzted Sta ' ed lOOO) ("Since the 1 950s. OlaC�<. �v . . .  en .� AND COHABITATION 1 9  23 (Linda J. Wat!e et al. s
h
··
. omen's '')· Joy Jones MarriaJ<e Is For '. steeply than w lte w · ' · ' 
ti l marriage rates have dechned much more .1 bl 1 LEXIS News L1brary, WPOST 1 e . 6 2006 at BO I ,  avm a e a , . od Whzte People WASH. POST, Mar. 2 • . ' . has been dropping smce the J 96Ds. and t ay . ' • +: African Amen cans · 1 200 I (statmg that "[t]he mamage rate ,or 
arria e rate of any racial group in the Un tted States
. n . . 
[African Americans] have the lowest m g k d 4 1  9 percent of black women m Amenca 43 3 percent of blac men an . . ") according to the U.S. Census, · t d 20 7 percent resn�"rtively for wh ttes · . 1 27 4 percen an · �--had never been married, m contrast 0 · 
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frequently than other American men. 54 These differences are observed 
even among men with similar levels of education and income. 55 These 
marital patterns have behavioral implications. Social scientists have 
observed that married men are more law abiding, more sober in their 
habits, less involved with drugs, less prone to mental i l lness, and generally 
healthier. They also tend to work harder, attain higher j ob status, and earn 
more income.56 Because white male adults are more likely than blacks to 
be married, it can be predicted that they will d isplay these desirable traits 
and characteristics more frequently. Once again, it would not be surprising 
if these patterns carried over to make whites, on average, more successful 
on the j ob. And that pattern might well prevail for a particular job, such as 
F loret delivery driver. 
In sum, these observations suggest that, overal l ,  black males may not 
be as well socialized or well prepared as their white counterparts for the 
demands and expectations of the workplace. This  could be so even for 
individuals evenly matched with regard to credentials-such as levels of 
education and years of schooling completed-that many employers rely 
on. These credentials operate as relatively crude screening devices that 
omit important, job-relevant information. That information could well 
reveal heterogeneity within otherwise matched populations . Indeed, many 
commonly employed job requirements fail to capture group differences 
that might bear on actual productivity and workplace success . As with 
juvenile justice, so with jobs:  seemingly similar populations may be 
dissimilar in important respects. And focusing on select parameters or 
characteristics, such as type of offense and past record for juvenile 
offenders, or high school graduation for workers, may provide an 
incomplete picture of all dimensions bearing on future behavior or 
performance. More information about group differences helps make better 
predictions. 
What are the implications for the Floret case? The social science 
literature on academic achi evement and family structure strongly suggests 
54 Jones, supra note 53. 
55 Ellwood & Crane, supra note 44, at 76. 
56 See, e.g. , JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON SHARED BEGINNINGS DIVERGENT LIVES 4 1 -
44 (2003) (suggesting ways in which marriage deters criminal behavior); Sanders Korenman & David 
Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282, 303-04 
( 1 99 1 )  (finding that married male workers are higher paid and receive h i gher performance rating�); 
Robert j_ Sampson et al., Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counteifactual Approach to Within­
Individual Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 465, 469 (2006) (concluding "marriage influences 
criminal behavior among men"); Avner Ahituv & Robert 1. Lerman, How Do Marital Status, Wage 
Rates, and Work Commitment Interact? 27 (lnst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1 688, 
2005), available at httpJ/ftp.iza.org/dp 1 688.pdf (finding higher earnings as a result of marriage). As 
Korenman and Neumark show, married men 's higher average earnings are not just a matter of 
a 
"selection" effect-that is, of the greater propensity of men with desirable attributes to maiTY· 
Korenman & Neumark, rupra, at 304. Rather, marriage actually induces men to work longer hours an
d 
earn more. 
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that the average black Floret delivery driver is  unlikely to be as capable, or to �erfo� as well . as, the �verage white driver. Indeed, in light of the social science data, 1t would mdeed be surprising i f  these groups performed equally well .  One c ould go so far as to say that the best prediction from the data available i s  that they would not. It follows that, given what we 
�ow, "supply s ide" differences are at least as plausible as unconscious 
b1as as an explanation for racial dispa..rities in the Floret drivers' 
performance,  and could well be more plausible. 
It may be argued that it  is unfair or even offensive for an organization 
suc
_
h as Floret to offe r  generalizations about group characteristics to defeat 
claims of discrimination--especially if  these assertions indulge the 
stereotype of b lacks as less capable workers. But such generalizations are 
necessary to defend against plaintiffs ' accusations, which rely on 
generalizations as well.  The lawsuit is based on data showing average 
differences by race: the accusation is  that Floret rates black drivers lower 
as a group than w hites. In defending against plaintiffs ' contentions, it is 
appropriate-and indeed necessary-to show that alternative explanations 
for group differences in job performance have not properly been ruled out. 
The discussion so far suggests several caveats. First, the evidence on 
average group differences says nothing about particular individuals. The 
data support generalizations about populations and point to differences 
between distinct groups as a whole .  Outstanding or underperfonning 
workers may exist i n  each category. Second, although the data would 
supp ort predictions about job performance for groups overall, it does not 
show that the subset of employees in a given lawsuit is perfectly 
representative of any group. Nor does it definitively prove that workers for 
a parti cular company will exemplify the relative dif!erences expected 
between populations-Dr a screened subset of populatwns-from wh1ch 
they are drawn. There may be other, unobserved or undocumented 
differences or similarities between workers from different races employed 
by a parti cular organization: For example, most black Floret_ 
drivers might 
just h appen to b e  married. But facts bearing on whether particular workers 
are demographically representative or not are subj ect to
 empmcal 
mvestigation. · 
Final ly, supply side arguments of this typ� say nothmg about �he 
on gms of racial disparities in qual ifications, ski l ls, . 
performan�e, or JOb 
d · · I · · rta t to understand that notmg these differences pro UCtlVIty. t IS IIDpO n . . 
entai ls  no  claim about the existence of genetiC dl
f eren�es between the 
S ·fi 11 ·t 1·mpJ1"es no position on the questw
ns of whether races. pec1 tea y, 1 . 
b d th Outgrowth of past or pres
ent soctal forces-such o serve patterns are e . 
d
. 
· · t1·0n disadvantage or cultural d iff
erence-or 
as poverty, Jscmmna , . ' 
w hether they p artly reflect biological factors . . 
I h tt. f the Floret lawsuit and m the absence of
 more 
n t e se mg o ' . . h · d . ·d · · fi rmat1·0n however drawmg mferences from t e m IVI uatmg m o ' ' 
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characteristics of populations is the best we c an do. Once again, such 
inferences are especial ly pertinent because the l awsuit is based on simi lar 
inferences-that is, from observed group di sparities in performance 
evaluations to the existence of group-based discrimination . Although there 
is no direct, individualized evidence that the bl ack del ivery drivers 
exemplify the sociodemographic attributes that predict poorer 
performance, there is l ikewi se no direct evidence that the black drivers are 
no different from whites in all  pertinent dimensions and in fact perform 
just as well .  In the same vein, however, the assertion that the ratings of 
black drivers are tainted by impermissible considerat ions of race is 
grounded solely in circumstantial evidence and established only by 
inference. Inadvertent rac e-based discrimination has not been-and indeed 
cannot be--directly observed or demonstrated under these circumstances. 
Although existing outcomes might be due to b ias, the mere possibility is a 
far cry from proof. It take s  a theory to beat a theory, and data to show 
which theory is correct. At best, the evidenc e  presented leaves rival 
possibil ities on the tab l e  without establishing the val idity of either. 
Certainly, in the absence of s omething more, discrimination cannot be 
regarded as a better or more plausible hypothesis  than the supply side 
explanations offered here. 
This discussion merely reiterates a fundamental principle that has been 
central to anti-discrimin ation law for some time and long predates the 
preoccupation with unconscious bias. Disparitie s  in employment should 
never be regarded as suffici ent to demonstrate that di scrimi nation is the 
cause of those disparities--either in whole or in part. The inference from 
differential outcomes by race or sex to unlawful d i scrimination requires 
excluding alternative possible explanations. 
Those who would defend a stronger-4)r even a conclusive-inference 
in today' s  climate would point out that there is now a substantial body of 
scientific and empirical work that purports to demonstrate that indiv iduals 
are routinely influenced in their thinking by racial  or sex-based stereotypes 
and biases. Because these are so pervasive, it must b e  assumed that they 
influence the outcomes o f  d ecisions that permit the i r  operation. Likew i s:, 
scholars rely on other types of behavioral data-such as field audit 
experiments-which they claim reveal the widespread influence of subtle 
unconscious biases. But as discussed more fully below ,57 the evidence 
falls far short of showing that unconscious bias can be assumed to distort 
social decision-making across the board or in any particular situation at 
issue. At best, existing data demonstrates that i dentity-based biases are 
intermittent, unpredictable, and c ontext sensitive, and can be extinguished 
by circumstantial or individuating information . To the extent they can be 
57 See infra notes 64--06 and accompanying text. 
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detected, they d o  not  a�ways operate to the detriment of di sadvantaged �oups,  but rather s ometimes operate in their favor. 58 In other cases th · d f b · 59 , e1r Irec IOn_ cannot . e _discerned. More importantly, studies that purport to reveal b1ased �h �nkmg have not reli ably l inked these mental p atterns to real-world dec1�1 0ns  that the law cares about. Indeed, there are only a handful of studies that even attempt to establish the connection between thought and action,  and all are seriously flawed.60 Furthermore, none even purports to compare the effect-if any-Df such biases relative to the types of suppl y  s i de factors discussed above. 
It _may b e  obj e cted that any group deficiencies in supply side 
determmants o f  success are themselves traceable to unlawful 
discrimination and racism-past, present, or both. Nothing h ere is  to the 
contrary. But the observation that past or present societal discrimination 
may b e  imp l ic ated in generating supply side differences-as reflected in 
some groups, on average, being underprepared or underachieving relative 
to others-must be sharply distinguished from the assertion that a 
particular c ompany, organization, or employer violates anti-discrimination 
laws by selecting, evaluating, or rewarding its employees on the basis of 
group identity. And that distinction stands regardless of whether 
discriminati on i s  claimed to be conscious or unconscious, inadvertent or 
deliberate . 
Thus, that b lacks are sometimes, or even regularly, the victims of 
discriminati on i s  not enough to establish that a particular organization, in 
adopting neutral methods of evaluating and assessing employees, must 
necessarily  be demonstrating a disregard-whether deliberate, careless, 
negl igent, or unconscious-for the well-being and interests of minorities or 
other protecte d  groups. Employers and economic actors take employees as 
they find them. That racism has contributed to making sam� em��oyees 
less qualified does not change the fact that they are less qual�fi�d.  . Nor 
does it obvious l y  follow that the proper respons_
e to �uch t nJ UStices ts 
indi scriminately to l evel accusations of discriminatiOn w�thout proof, or to 
dispense with the need to marshal evidence. Th_
e qu�stwn of what to do 
about  the legacy of racial discrimination IS highly charged . 
�nd 
controversi al .  But the fact that private actors respond . 
to ex1stmg 
disp arities does not justify treating them as if they are responsible
 for _tho�e 
disparities in the first p lace .  Nor does it fol low that the prope
r reactiOn 1s 
t r · t tr at workers equally regardless of whether some fal l  o 10rce comp am es o e 
h 
· - r-�'"'"' A n P  racial group over others who S Oft, Or tO promote WOrKef� ll vw v u �  • 
58 See infra notes 89-9 1 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 60 S . ifr t 1 04-06 and accompanying text. 
61 
ee tn a no es 
Wh t Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?, 1 4 1  U .  PA. L. R EV. 1 49 .  See Larry Alexander, a 
h h d his hands "vil lainously cut off' need not be al lowed to 1 88 ( 1 992) (suggesting that a surgeon w o a 
continue performing operations). 
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perform better, or to somehow compensate for observed performance 
differences or pretend they do not exist. 
Rectifying past or present injusti ce by addressing "root causes" is a 
fundamentally different exercise from c laiming that a particular social 
actor is discriminating. This p oint holds regardless of whether the claimed 
discrimination is deliberate or inadvertent. Likewise, the solution to an 
unj ust social order is not to redefine all differences as discrimination. 
Rather, it requires addressing the sources of disparities and correcting 
them. Alternatively, the situation calls for doing the hard work of 
explaining why disparate inputs shouldn 't matter--or, to put it more 
coocretely, why a person of one race should be rewarded and promoted 
over others despite doing a measurably worse j ob. In other words, it 
requires explaining why we should j ettison the current way of doing 
business in favor of another set of rules. Any explanation inevitably will 
raise the question of how such rules should be justified. Thi s  brings us 
back to the familiar conundrums of whether and how rigorously selection 
practices should be scientifically validated. These issues are central to the 
debate over the legal status of disparate impact claims, but have--or at 
least should have-very little to do with allegations of disparate treatment, 
whether unconscious or not. Yet these questions are routinely conflated in 
the context of discussions about unconscious bias.62 At the very least, 
there is a serious disconnect between the sociodemographic data on human 
capital development, behavior, and performance and the legal scholarship 
on unconscious bias. This renders many discussions of unconscious bias in 
the law and policy literature seriously defective, or at best radi cally 
incomplete. 
In light of these blind spots, it is instructive to ask what would count as 
good evidence that unconscious discrimination h ad been purged from the 
procedures of a company like Floret, short of equal numerical 
representation by race. Apart from achievin g  quota-like workforce 
diversity, how could an accused organization exonerate itself of the 
alleg�tion of unconsciously biased decision-making? Addressing this 
questiOn would go far towards inj ecting a needed rigor into discussions of 
unconscious bias. Given the current legal scholarship in the field, it is hard 
to know what the answer to this question would be. 
Final
_
ly, none of these points mean that retrospective analyses are never 
"":0rt�w�I le: Nor does it fol low that real-world practices can never re
veal 
dtscnmmatwn. But the most careful and methodical studies can only go so 
. 
. 62. See, e.g. , Marcel C. Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII Ll�lgatl�n: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 13 9 U. PA. L. REV. 455, 45&--57 ( 1 990) (dJscu�smg the problems of statistical analysis in establishing disparate impact claims). In fairness,  confusiOn may st� partly _from some degree of overlap in the kinds of statistical evidence that can be rel:vant to both disparate Impact and disparate treatment claims. Despite this, the logic  of the two claims, and the steps ultimately needed to prove them, are distinct. 
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far. Indeed, .even �h e  best research cannot establish with certainty that complex, mentocratic systems are distorted by group-based biases.  Some recent efforts along these l ines i l lustrate potential pitfalls.  As already 
.
note? , there i s  rising concern about the under-representation of women m science and their failure to reach top echelons. 63 Several studies have sought to uncover gender bias in the allocation of positions and rewards i n
. 
scientifi c  fields. One study, by Christine Wenneras and Agnes Wold, clatms to be the "first ever analysis" of the peer review process for awarding post-doctoral scientific fellowships.64 The authors attempted to determine why the Swedish Medical Research Council (MRC}-one of the main funding agencies for biomedical research in that country-awarded a re latively small number of grants to women scientists. The authors 
observed that the pattern of awards reflected the lower ratings women 
scientists received from the MRC review panels assigned to evaluate grant 
appl ications. According to the authors, the scores supposedly reflected the 
referees ' j udgments about the candidates ' productivity and the value and 
importance of their research. 65 
In tryin g  to d etermine whether female applicants were treated less 
favorably than male, the authors could not assume that the men and women 
candidates as a whole were similarly qualified or otherwise equally 
matched. Although the authors did not reveal detailed data concerning 
gender differences, if any, between the male and female applicants, their 
methods w ere directed at controlling for variation in potentially relevant 
dimensions such as training, productivity, and field of interest . The 
challenge was to determine the criteria by which candidates wer
.
e actually 
j udged and then to compare men and women with similar credentials.  
In trying to gauge qualifications, the authors chos� . 
to create a 
"bibliometric" measure, or "total impact" jnd�x o�rodu�tiVIty, based . 
on 
quantity and quality of candidates ' pubhcatwns. �smg a regression 
analysis to control for other factors that might make a difference-�uch as 
. . 
d h rt' lar committee evaluatmg the area of research trammg, an t e pa Icu 
· 
' 
h d omen who matched on the c andidate-the authors found t at men an w 
authors ' impact index did not receive the same MRC scores and were not 
funded at equal rates. This suggested that wome� needed to be · · · 
h · order to wm support. The significantly more productive t an men m . . . 1 authors concluded that women fellowship candidates m their samp e
f 
w
h
e�e 
t d 1 ss well solely because o t e1r discriminated against; they were trea e e 
63 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
N . nd Sexism in Peer-Revinv 387 NATURE 34 1 .  64 Christine Wenneras & Agnes Wold, eponsm a ' 
341  ( 1 997). 
65 !d. d.d t 's number of publications, whether the candidate was 66 "Impact factors" incl�ded the cS:r� �� a rs were publ ished, the number of t imes they were first author, the qu.ality of th.e Joumals w�. h the �it�ions appeared. !d. at 341-42. ctted,  and the quality of the Journals m w J C  
1 008 
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Are these observations conclusive? What are the possible flaws in 
such a retrospective study? By using statistical techniques, the authors 
attempted to account for any important input--{)r "supply 
side"--differences between men and women applicants, thereby isolating 
the effects of gender alone. Without directly reporting exactly how the 
committees made their decisions or what factors they relied on, the 
researchers developed an index that they bel ieved accurately reflected the 
elements of productivity and quality that the evaluating committees would 
most care about. 
The most important caveat attending such a design is that the 
researchers may have missed something. Perhaps there were differences 
between the male and female candidates that were not immediately 
obvious and not fully captured by the researchers ' "impact factor" index 
and regression controls. And perhaps the committees observed and relied 
on those differences. For example, the authors say nothing about the 
content of the grant application itself. Nor do they mention the quality and 
content of recommendations or the graduate school record . Although they 
tried to assess the candidates ' past proj ects indirectly by counting citations 
to published work, they had no direct measure of quality. Originality, 
generativity, creativity, rigor, and the overall importance of work to the 
field may not have been fully captured by the researchers' c itation index. 
In light of these possibilities, the observed gender disparities are merely 
suggestive of discrimination, but far from conclusive .  
The Wenneras and Wold results, although generating a good deal of 
attention, came from a single, small study in one country and involved data 
that is now more than ten years old. Other attempts to find clear sex-based 
discrimination in scientific research have found less impressive results. 
Tom Tregenza recently examined the refereeing process that controls 
which papers are accepted and published in the fields of ecology and 
evolution. Using a complicated design with multiple controls, he found 
women ?id not have a l ower publication acceptance rate for submitted 
manuscnpts overall and concluded that there was no evidence that the 
process is discriminatory. The author noted that women's papers scored 
lower on some criteria-including first authorship and number of autho�� 
on the paper-that can be shown to influence the chances of acceptance. 
A:Ithou� Trege�a's  results show little convincing evi dence of ge�der 
b1as, ills study ts nonetheless open to some of the same questwns 
concerning controls, statistical analysis, and study design that apply to the 
W enneras and Wold study. 
67 !d. at 342-43. 
68 Tom Tregenza, Gender Bias in the Refereeing Process ? 1 7 TRENDS TN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 349, 349-50 (2002). . ' 
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An�a Ledin and col leagues recently investigated women 's lower rates of fundmg fr
.
om the European Molecular Biology Organizati on (EMBO), both under Its Long-Term Fellowship (LTF) and Young Investigator Progra�me (YIP). 69 Pursuant to their stated goal of "test[ing] whether uncon�cwus gender bias influenc[ ed] the decisions made by the selection corrumttee," the authors introduced an important change in the selection proc�ss:  they removed information about the sex of the appl icant before sendmg fi les to the funding committees for evaluations. 70 The authors foun� that men ' s  higher success rate for the LTF fel lowships persisted. 
Despite sex-b l inding, male scientists were stiJ I  awarded more fellowships 
than women. 7 1  
I n  trying t o  understand the roots o f  thi s  sex-blinded differential, the 
authors set out "to correlate the committee's decisions with an assumed 
unbiased measure: the bibliometric data for each applicant."72 Although 
conceding that "the publication record was only a part of the committee 's 
consi derations, " they nonetheless developed an index based on 
pub l i cations and c i tation frequency not unlike that used by Wenneras and 
Wold.  73 Comp arisons based on the publication index yielded a mixed 
picture. Although the average "impact factor" for awardee females overal l 
was sl ightly h igh er than for males, gender differences disappeared when 
the impact factor was re-computed using only first and last author 
publications. 74 This suggested that publications were weighted by a 
formula that was n ot captured by a straightforward citation count. 
Th e  authors also noted that the pool of female appl icants overall was 
not as qual ified as the men. In particular, the
. 
av
.
erage female grant 
applicant had fewer publications and a lower citatiOn count than the 
average male. Thus, although the average impact index for wom�n 's 
output appeared comparable to men 's on some m�as�res-reflectmg, 
perhaps, high er quality of papers-the average male �c1e?ttst had a gr�a�er 
number of publ ications. The authors speculate that this htgher productJvi:Y 
alone-apart from quality measures, at least as a�s.essed by the author s 
criteria-may have influenced the committee 's  dectstons. T�e authors also 
found that the p attern of female under-productivity perststed e�en .for 
h d d fi l lowships That the funded women scientists women w o were awar e e · 
continued to la behind the funded men in scienti fic out�u� sugg
ested that 
the fel lowship �omrnittee 's predictions of fut�e productivity, as reflected · · · � 11 wsh 1ps were not unwarranted . m relatively  fewer women rece1vmg 1e o , 
. p bl . Traditional Gender Roles Hold B
ack Female 
69 Anna Ledin et al . ,  A Persrstenl ro em
. 
Scientists, 8 EMBO REP. 982, 982 (2007). 
70 Jd. 
71 !d. at 982-83. 
7 2  !d. at 982. 
73 Jd. at 982-83. 
74 Jd. 
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Likewise, for the YIP fellowships-which were general ly reserved for 
j unior professors-the authors found that, alth ough women ' s  publications 
had about the same "impact" scores as the men ' s, women applicants 
published fewer papers overal l .  In addition, there were other differences. 
The women applicants did more teachin�, had lower rank, and presided 
over smaller labs than the male applicants. 5 
In general, the Ledin data suggests that the situation for women 
scientists is more ambiguous than indicated by the Wenneras and Wold 
results. In particular, the Ledin data reveals important "supply side" 
differences that could account for most or even a l l  the gender shortfall in 
scientific grants. Women scientists are on average less productive than 
men-a finding that has been made repeatedly in academic science .76 The 
Ledin study speculates that this could be due in part to women ' s  greater 
family responsibilities or different priorities for time use. 77 It has al so been 
suggested that women are hobbled by discri mination in the allocation of 
resources that might al low women to be more productive .n However, 
resources are both a reward for productivity and a faci l itator of it. The 
causal relationships are thus difficult to sort out.  
But perhaps the most dramatic difference between the Wenneras and 
Wold and the Ledin research i s  that the l atter used a sex-blinded procedure. 
The finding that gender-bl inding did not increase the number of 
fellowships awarded to women strongly suggests that the EMBO 
fellowship process was not biased agai nst women.  M ore specifically, it 
refutes the claim that unconscious bias was the c ause of fewer grants being 
awarded to women. 
The Ledin research also suggests that retrospective studies of 
procedures where the gender of the candi date is revealed to the decision­
maker are a second-best method for assessing c laims of discrimination.  
Identity-blinded processes  are far superi or because they definitively 
remove the influence o f  race or sex. Thus the question of whether the 
"impact index" in the Wenneras and Wold study took full  account of all 
relevant differences between men and women-and al l  differences the 
committees actually relied on--can only real l y  be settled by subtracting 
gender from the equation. Since the initial p roce dure for awarding the 
Swedish fellowships revealed gender, what is needed is a sex-bli nd re-
75 Id. at 983-84. 
76 S R h . d . Medical . ee, e.g., es rna Jags1 et al . ,  The "Gender Gap · ·  in A uthorship of A ca ernie 
Literature--a 35-Year Perspective, 3 5 5  NEW ENG. J . M ED. 2 8 1 ,  2 8 3  (2006) (finding 
that though 
women authors have shown increased representation since 1 97 0  in three general med ical joumals, th
ey 
still represent only 23 .2% of first-time authors and 1 2.7% of sen ior authors); J . Scott Long, 
Measures 
ofSex_ Differences in Scientific Productivity, 7 1  Soc. FORCES 1 59,  1 74-75 ( 1 992 )  (finding that female 
Sclent;.;>ts ha
_
ve a lower rate of publication than male sci entists). Ledm et al . , supra note 69, at 984. · 
n S B " ·ucal . , �e, e.g , EYOND BIAS AND B ARRIERS, supra note 2 8 .  at 1 22 ( noting that the e n vanable m the gender diffierenc · bl . · · · · ") e m  pu 1Cat10n productivity IS "acc ess to resources · 
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assessment �fter the fact. This is easier said than done. The materials used to rate appl icants would have to be purged of any information about sex . Those fi les :vould then have to be sent out for evaluation by experts in the fi�ld . . 
A vahd re-assessment would require multiple reviews, so many able 
scientists w�u l d  have to be conscripted. Further, preserving anonymity 
would be dtfficult because the identity of some applicants might be 
apparent from other aspects of the file. Assuming all of these challenges 
could be met, h owever, the information obtained would be i nvaluable. If 
blinding produced better outcomes for women than the initial unblinded 
process, it would stand as persuasive evidence that women were not being 
assessed fairly in the first place. On the other hand, if outcomes for 
women were the same, it would indicate that gender differentials were not 
due to bias----<:onscious or unconscious-but rather to disparities in 
qualifications or other factors.79 
So why not just adopt sex (or race) blinding across the board? As 
noted, i dentity blinding is  a cumbersome process that is often hard to 
accomp lish. And setting up a blinded and truly anonymous protocol may 
not be feasible in  some settings. Many areas of scientific research are 
h ighly i nteractive, so it is bard to mask the identity even of junior persons 
working in a field. Finally, anonymous procedures can be criticized as 
leaving out important information needed to make the best choice. A l l  of 
these concerns h inder attempts to introduce identity-neutral ity in broad 
areas of social l ife .  
I I I .  PROSPECTIVE EVIDENCE OF UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
Are there other possibilities for demonstrating the influence of 
unconscious bias on the types of decisions-in education, the job market, 
science, and other spheres-that the law cares about? . 
Inste�d of 
examining the type of real-world outcomes that pose th� dtfficui:Jes of 
controlling for complex inputs, researchers have s�ught to Iso la:e evidence 
of uncon scious bias by examining decision-makmg prospectively.  Yet 
others are focused on developing tests of stereotyping in mental processes 
or h abits of thinking, with a few attempting to tie those measures to 
discriminatory behavior. . . . . . 
Common prospective methods for de�ons�atmg d1scn
mmatwn-: 
whether conscious or unconscious-are audit testmg and
 match�d resume 
studies. Here the focus is on experimentally controllmg al l the mpu:s that 
are thought to go into a decision while varying
 only race or se� . m ihe 
early 1 990s for example, the Urban Institute sent
 black and whtte testers 
79 Cl udia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orc
hestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" 
See, e.g., a . . 90 AM ECON REV. 7 1 5  (2000). Auditions on Female Musicwns, · · 
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with similar paper credentials to apply for jobs i n  several urban markets.80 
They also sought to match the demeanor and personal appearance of the 
testers. They found that employers were somewhat less wi l l ing to 
interview and hire blacks than whites, although the differentials were not 
dramatic and there were no differences observed in some employment 
markets.8 1  Likewise, Devah Pager has used audit studies to demonstrate 
that employers generally favor white over black ex-convicts with similar 
criminal records and measured personal characteristics.x2 
Because these studies arguably isolate th e  effect of race by controlling 
for many other inputs to the job selection process, they provide good 
evidence that employers sometimes take race  into account.x3 Nonetheless, 
two points are in order. First, these studies do not definitively demonstrate 
the operation of unconscious or inadvertent-as opposed to del i berate and 
conscious--bias in employment. They thus c annot be viewed as specific 
methods for eliciting unconscious discrimination, as opposed to more 
traditional forms. Second, the patterns observed in these studies are most 
consistent with statistical or "rational" discri mination.�W That testers have 
similar resumes and are matched on the main elements of personal 
deportment does not prevent employers from relying on race as a proxy for 
real productivity-related differences that are d i ffi cult to observe directly. 
Because, as already noted, blacks and white s  di ffer in j ob-related skills 
despite similarity in many standard credentials,  and because i ndivi dual ized 
information about new hires i s  l imited, empl oyers may find it cost effective 
to use race as a way to screen workers. For e x ample, employers may 
believe that black ex-<:onvicts differ on average from white ex-convicts in 
ways that bear on job performance.  And they may bel i eve that these 
differences exist despite superficial s imilari t ies i n  ex-convicts'  criminal 
records, work h istories, and years of education.  . 
Are those beliefs just i fied? The observations pertinent to the juvemle 
j�tice situation and the Floret case l i kewise apply here. Average 
differences by race i n  academic achievement, family structure, and other 
80 See, e.g. , Michael Fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in _CLEAR .� 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASU REM ENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA I ,  I 8-20 (Michael FI . Raym?n.d 1·. Struyk eds., 1 993). For a critique of this work, see James J . Heckman, D
etectmg 
Dzsc�r;rm
.
aflon, 1 2  J. EcoN. PERSPS. 1 0 1 ,  1 04---{)5 ( 1 998) (discussing audit studies). FlX et al., supra note 80 at 20 22 24 
82 DJ:VAu u .. r- r- n.  ' • .  ' ' ' . F MASS - . ,  u. ' r\\Jr.K., MARKED: RACE, CRJME, AND FINDING WORK TN AN ERA 0 INCARCERATION 1 01 ,  1 06 (2007). 
. 83 �ut cf Heckman, supra note 80, at I 08 (suggesting that the audit studies do not perfectly match Job �didates, and thus leave room for employers relying on factors other t.han race). 1c 
L 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of lob Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIM IN ATION IN ECON��M �83• 97 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., I 972 )  (discussing statisti cal discrimination in job markets), 008) 
(d. 0R?• THE_�IC OF LlFE: THE RATIONAL EcONOMICS OF AN IRRATIONAL WORLD cb. 6 (2£ · ISCUSSmg statlstJcal discri . ,.; ) · G J  c· ., Rights ra. 
B nd 
. rruna ..on • enn C. Loury. Discrimination in the Post- 1"1 . ra 
P
::
ll.A
Market Interactions, 1 2  J. EcoN. PERSPS. 1 1 7, 1 23 ( 1 998 ) (same); see also discussiOn SliP 
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backgroun� factors bearing on socialization may carry over to subp?pulatwns o f  men who commit crimes. Are black and white ex­con�Ict� really com�arable i n  their abi lity and wil lingness to perfonn on the 
_
J ob .  Just as high school graduates may di ffer by race in crucial attn�utes �earing on their desirabi lity as workers, ex-convicts may also. Audit studies that match for personal presentation and criminal record create the appearance of simi lar starting points, but cannot ful ly  control for these background differences . Nonetheless, whether such d ifferentials 
actually exist �o r  ex-convicts is an empirical question that must ultimately 
be assessed directly. One approach might be to examine outcomes. Do 
black ex-convi ct s  as a group do as well at work as white ex-convicts when 
matched on the criteria used in the audit studies? This  woul d  be a good 
test of whether employer discrimination ofth is  type is "rational ."  
Nonethe l ess,  prospective audit studies are stil l  far more usefu l  than 
retrospective analyses of real-world data because they can more rel iably 
reveal rel iance on race. In the retrospective situation, it is impossible to 
know for sure whether decision-makers are actually using race. There may 
be other attributes influencing choice that are not apparent to researchers or 
outside observers. In contrast, the audit situation can reveal rel i ance on 
race d irectl y  because other infonnation presented to the decision-maker 
can be directly controlled. But the fact that testing studies can and do 
sometimes strongly suggest the operation of race-based discri mination 
does not change the social fact that the background populations from 
whi ch the testers are drawn are not necessarily the same. That is,  it does 
not negate the existence of background "supply side" differences by race. 
The empl oyers in the audit  studies may simply be playing the odds that the 
white employee testers will prove better than the black ones, even if they 
appear evenly m atched. The evidence suggests that, in many c ases, that 
assumption may be val id.  . . _ 
Although the audit studies may best be explamed as revea h�g a tonn 
of "rational" discrimination, it is important to remember that th 1s  type of 
behavior i s  i l l egai.85 Nonetheless, there is  no reason to bel ieve that 
employers ' crude efforts to choose the most productive employees operate 
through unconscious-as opposed to quite_ 
del! b�rate-proccsses,  and there 
appears to be nothing about this type of d1scnmmat10n tha� recent work m 
cognitive psychology can especially i l lu minate. The more t�portan t �omt ,  
h · that observed patterns do not necessa n ly pom t  to rcs1dual owever, IS . 
d · · 1 d . · · t . as the ��0rlnrt nf unconsci ous, hard-wtrcd, an t rrat 1ona ISCnmma lOll j-11 u ... �. �- - . . . . 
features of the human psyche; rather, such d iscnmmat10n as  l i kely 
t efficl
.
ency driven accommodat ion to the present soc 1a l  represen s an -
ss . · note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the i l lega l i ty of di sparate See dtscusston supra · · · 1 
· 1 VII f the Civil R ights Act of 1 964 ); see also supra Part I I .  A (ex p lammf! ratJnna treatment under Ttt e o 
discrimination based on race). 
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reality. The reality is that, for now, race remains a cheap, albeit i mprecise, 
proxy for performance-related traits that employers and others care about. 
But thi s  characterization of residual discrimination as rooted in pragmatic 
concerns has very different implications than the view that invidious 
stereotyping is an automatic and universal feature o f  the human m ind . 
In dealing with statistical bias in h iring, the key question i s  what 
society should do about it. Not only is  this type of discrimination 
unlawful, but it is also unfair and counterp roductive. If soc ial  actors 
assume that individuals are representative of the ir underperforming group, 
then talented persons will receive fewer rewards than they deserve. This 
can undermine group members' incentives to d istinguish themselves, thus 
discouraging self-development.86 It is thus essential that the civi l rights 
laws be vigorously enforced against discrimination of al l kinds, whether 
"rational" or not. Nonetheless, eradicating stat istica l discrimination is 
difficult. Where race is a valid proxy for productivity-related traits 
employers have strong economic incentives to pay a ttention to it .  And bias 
based on real group differences can be hard to d emonstrate, because it 
mimics permissible reliance on job-related attributes .  
One method for minimizing statistical b ias i s  the u s e  of more rigorous 
forms of screening-such as cognitive abil ity testin g-that do a better job 
of sorting individuals. As already noted, such methods have come under 
attack as having a disparate impact on minority groups . R7 Another tactic is 
to focus on attacking root causes: indeed, the most e ffective way to defeat 
selection based on group differences is for those differences to disappear.88 
Any discussion of how best to bring thi s  about is far beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. But whether the bias at issue is  unconsci ous or not wi l l have 
no appreciable impact on how to tackle the problem of raci al disparities in 
society and the statistical biases that feed off of them. 
This brings us back to the subj ect of this conference and this  paper: 
the unconscious or inadvertent use of race to make decisions about 
individ�ls. J?e _
question is how to identify unconsci ous bias or detect 
unconscw
_
us d1scnmination, with emphasis on the unconscious element. 
?nee agam, does there exist hard and fast evidence of the operation of 
madv�rte?t-� opP?�ed to deliberate or strategic-discrirni�atory behaviOr m so�tal d�c�ston-making? What might that evidence look hke: 
On reflectiOn, It IS not surprising that data pertinent to this specific 
(d
. 86 �ee, e.g.: � R. �unstein, The Anticaste Principle 92 M ICH L REV 24 1 0  24 1 7-1 9 < 1 994) ISCUssmg possible mcent:Jve effects of statistical d. . . • . . . . RA •E WRONGS AND REMEDIES (forthcoming 2008) (on file with C I�mmat10n): AMY L. WAX, C , 
' 
S1 s K 1m Dnnect:Jcut Law Review). 
K lm 
ee e anh, supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 208-14 (questioning the validity of general abil i ty tests). As e an notes, sue tests are far from perfi --th . ut some 
persons who can do the · b 'd ect ey also mvolve general izations and screen ° JO · 1, . at 1 224 & n 1 95 B 1 . · d '" t to some 
d Se I d. · · · ut a I screenmg methods have th1s e1ec egre� e a SO ISCUSSIOO supra p. J 4. For more on this point, see WAX, supra note 86. 
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question are i n  short supply. The principal reason is that states of mind cannot be directly observed. As already discussed, it is hard enough to �gure out �hether a decision is influenced by race. Proof is almost always c irc.umstantial . Demonstrating that the discriminatory treatment was accidental-as o�posed to deliberate-is harder yet. If social actors deny that they are relymg on race, how do we show they are deceivin g  us? How are we to know what they are thinking? We are not privy to others ' mental states. The challenge is finding a reliable check on these types of representations. 
Only a few studies come close to meeting that challenge. Michael 
Norton and collaborators use a clever experimental design to suggest that 
subjects are n ot aware of how race and sex affect their choices. In their 
studies, student subjects were asked to evaluate files for college admission 
candidates and applicants for jobs. The college admission files presented a 
complex mix on a range of credentials-including grades and test scores. 
The job candidate dossiers presented credentials along two main 
dimensi ons-educational background and job experience. The students 
were then asked serially to decide whether to admit, or reject, each college 
appl icant, or to hire, or not to hire, each job candidate into a specified 
position .  The researchers found that, when the files presented a mixed 
picture-strong on s ome credentials, weak on others-the students were 
not consistent i n  weighting the various factors across all candidates . In 
fact, the race or sex of the candidate systematically influenced which 
credentials the students weighted as more important.89 
The results for race and gender were surprising . When presented with 
white and black coll ege admission appl icants, subjects tended 
_
to weight 
credentials to favor blacks . For example, if the black cand1date was 
stronger on grades than a white candidate, they�anked the 
.
black higher and 
later declared grades to be more important. And th1s tendency was 
observed in all students regardless of how they rat�d on quest10nna1res 
designed to gauge racial prej udice. Even s�bJ�cts wh� rated as 
"consciously" prejudiced were not "unconsciously bmsed agamst blacks. 
In fact, quite the contrary: most students had internalized a
. 
strong norm of 
affirmative action. For the jobs, in contrast, almost all subj ects val ued the 
S9 S M
. 
h 1 I N rton et a( Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of I.£J(ilimal<' and ee IC ae . o . 
. 
. , 
k. 12 PSYCHOL PuB. POL'Y & LAW J(i,  40-44 (2001)), Illegitimate Criteria on DeciSion Ma mg, · · vandello darley pd f (fi nding in one · 11 - · -lo hho edu/mnorton/norton sommers_ _ · avarlable at http: www.peOyw· .. --. . -h .t candt'dates and i nflated the value of some . . fu red black candtdates over w 1 e study that partiCipants �0 . . 1 t )· Mt'chael I Norton et al . ,  Cawisfrr· and Social red · 1 · 'fy dec1stons tn nonrac1a enns • · - . c entia s to JUSt! 
8 1 7  820 (2004) [hereinafter Norton. CaswstryJ, C . 87 J PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. • ategory Bws, . 
f du/-vandello/Norton VandelloDarley-Casuistry. pd f  ("[M)ale available at http://www.cas.us .e . . · sffy that selection by inflating the importance participants who select men for managemen t �sJtt�ns JU 1 
f h
. J ' fi  f favors a male candtdate. ). . o w tchever qua 1 tea JOn. 89 824 (''When the Black candidate had a h 1 gher GPA 90 See Norton, Casuzstry, supra note • at . .. 
than the White candidate, participants inflated the Importance
 of GP A . . . . ) . 
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credentials to favor the male job candi date.9 1  However, the experiment 
was only conducted for a job--supervisor for a construction project-that 
was heavily male stereotyped. As the researchers point out, the result here 
would not necessarily extend to positions that were sex-neutral or female­
typed. 
The design of the Norton studies strongly s uggests some influence for 
inadvertent bias, as revealed in the weighting function. The subj ects were 
instructed to be as obj ective as possible, but forcing them to deal with 
complex data for many different candidates made systematic comparisons 
difficult. It is a plausible inference-but o f  course only an inference-that 
the subjects were unaware that race or sex skewed their j udgments. 
More importantly, these studies reveal that, even if unconscious 
identity-based bias does sometimes come into play, it does not necessarily 
operate in a predictable direction. Here, blacks d i d  better than whites in 
some conditions and men than women in others. In a different context, the 
pattern could well shift. It i s  thus quite dange rous  to infer from isolated 
experiments of this kind that b ias is operating in any particular situation, or 
in one d irection rather than another. Each instance o f  real-worl d behavior 
must be evaluated separately. Obviously this  is burdensome and 
methodologically difficult. But the alternative is intolerable:  to credit 
nefarious accusations of d iscrimination against minori ties or women that 
may well have no basis in fact. 
Is there other research that provides persuasive evidence for the 
operation of inadvertent b iases in real-world tasks? Recent unpubl ished 
papers by two teams of economists describe intriguing attempts to detect 
race-based discrimination in the sports world. Unl ike the Norton studies, 
this work is not based on prospective laboratory experiments .  Rather, it 
makes use of retrospective data. 
Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers examined thousands of foul cal ls  by 
NBA basketball referees. They found that, even when control ling for 
�ny potentia
.lly confounding factors, black p layers were sl ig
htly more 
hkely to receive foul calls from white referee crews than from black 
referee crews. Likewise, white players had more fouls  called on the� by 
black referees than by referees of their own rac e.92 These observations 
strongly suggest that race influences the frequency of foul cal ls. 
Mor�ver, the circumstances surrounding fou l  cal1s-including the 
oversight and fairness safeguards in place, the smali magnitude of the 
� . . . 
. . See id. at 8 2 1  ("Thus, although education was seen as more important in this dect
ston, 
participants still selected the male candidate the majority of the time even when he was Jess 
educated."). 
'12 Se J b Pri · 7 n-lat'l e osep ce & Justm Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees 25-2 l " Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1 3206, 2007). available_ a: 
httpf ://bpp.wh�on.upenn.edu/jwolfers!Papers!NBARace.pdf (finding statistically signi ficant eV1denc o own-race b1as among NBA referees). 
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overall . differences (which w�re detected only over numerous plays) and the spht-second speed at wh1ch the calls are made-all strongly suggest that th� r�ferees are l argely unaware that race affects their decisions. It rs r_mportant �o realize, however, that the design of the analysis does not �err�ut . concluswns about which players are being unfairly victimized by d1scnmmation. Specifically, the data does not necessari ly indicate that black players are being discriminated against. The study compares the fouls called on players of different races by black and white referees. It does not, h owever, provide a baseline measure of the "correct" number of fouls for players o f  either race. Thus the data is equa11y consistent with several alternative patterns. 
One possib i l ity is that referees of both races are pervasively, i f  subtly, 
biased, with all referees systematically favoring their own while 
disfavoring the opposite race. That is, black and white referees are equal ly 
l ikely to deviate from what is "fair'' and make the wrong cal ls  for all 
players. An alternative possibility is  that referees of one race-wh ite or 
b l ack-are altogether fair to everyone, while referees of the opposite race 
are biased towards everyone-they systematically favor their own players 
and disfavor opposite race players. But on thi s  scenario it is impossible to 
tell which group of referees is fair or biased. In particular, the data is 
potentially consi stent with white referees being entirely "fair" to players of 
both races whi l e  black referees are discriminating-against white players 
and in favor o f  black--or vice versa. That players of one race receive 
more foul calls from opposite-race referees is not necessari ly i ncons istent 
with this: it could well  be that white or black players actual ly commit more 
fouls on average or play more aggressively.93 Thus, although bias of some 
kind seems to be operating, it is  impossible to know whether i t  runs agai nst 
or i n  favor of minority players--or both. Likewise, it is i mpossible to 
know which referees' calls are distorted .94 Because most referees are 
currently white, the overal l  effect at present is that white players are 
subj ect to relatively fewer foul cal ls than black players . Bu.
t, as al ready 
noted this is n ot necessarily an unfair situation. That 1 s ,  1t 1s not 
neces�ari ly the product of an inaccurate bias against black players. 
Likewise, it is i mpossible to tel l wh�ther increasing the n�mber �: black 
referees would increase or decrease biased-as opposed to correct � fou l  
calls . Because i t  i s  at least possible that only black referees are htased, 
increasing the number of black referees wil l  no� nec�ssanly .
make the game 
f: · ·t mr·g·n(· 'na· ·e +hco nnnosite effect Likewise, add mg more whtte more 3Jr; } V lll'-' vyy ' 
93 In f th d ta shows that black players have sl ightly more fouls per game. hut wh i le  player; act, e . a e) have more fouls per minute played. See id al th1 . 2 .  However. (who play fewer mmutes per gam · · · · h d · · d' ar once a few observable charactenstJcs such as hc1ght .  wei /(  I. an these racial differences Isappe 
position are controlled. See id. at 6 n.3.  . . . 
94 See id. at 26 ("[U}nfortunately our framework
 ts not well-su1ted to sor1 1ng out  whether these 
It d . by the actions of black or white refere
es.") .  resu s are n ven 
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referees might make the game more, or less, fair; or it might j ust shift the 
balance of favoritism from blacks to whites.  
In a similar study, Christopher Parsons and his colleagues determined 
that, after controlling for potentially confounding factors , baseball umpires 
are more likely to call strikes for pitchers of the same race or ethnicity.
95 
That is, umpires seem to favor pitchers from their own group. As with the 
Price and Wolfers observations, the e ffects are small and can only be 
detected when very large numbers of games are evaluated . Similarly, these 
authors' comparative data do not reveal the direction of the bias relative to 
any objective baseline o f  "fair" calls.  It is thus impossible to determine 
whether minorities are the recipients of affirmative action fro m  their same­
race umpires, the victims of discrimination from other-race umpires, or 
both. Likewise, the results do not reveal w hether umpires from some 
groups are fair-and others biased-Dr whether all umpires are biased. 
Once again, however, the predominance o f  white umpires suggests that 
white players will do better than players from other groups. But whether 
that advantage is  fair or unfair-whether it is the product of unjust 
discrimination against minorities or the relative paucity of unjust 
discrimination in favor of minorities-is impossible to discern. 
Nonetheless, these two studies represent some of the best evidence so 
far that inadvertent, "subtle" race-based biases might have some i nfluence 
on patterns of real-world social decision-making. At most, however, they 
suggest that identity biases might affect some decisions some of the time. 
And those effects appear quite small--they are detectable only with 
sophisticated statistical analyses on large data s ets involving many decision 
points. Finally, in keeping with the Norton studies detailed above, it is not 
possible to predict ahead of time the direction o f  these biases. That is, on 
the current state of knowledge it cannot be determined with any confidence 
whether cognitive biases will  favor or disfavor minority group members or 
whites, or neither, or both. Generalizations are unwarranted: each instance 
of soc�al decision-making must be evaluated case by c ase.  
Gtven these vicissitudes, scientists have tried to develop more 
powerful tools for predicting unconscious dis criminatory motive. As 
alr�ady noted, co�it�ve psychologists have developed a laboratory test �f 
spht-secon� as�octatiOn-tb� Implicit Associati on Test (IA T)-that � 
thought to Implicate unconsciOus processes of stereotyping about groups_
. 
The test measures people' s  tendency to associate nenative words with black faces. The significance of that association to re�l world decision-
95 See Christopher A Parso et 1 s · . · 24 (Nat'! 
B Ec · n
s a . ,  tnke Three: Umpires ' Demand for Discrimmatwn 
h
tt
p
ureJa/u he
r
on. Research, Working Paper No. 1 3 665 2007) available at www.n .orgfpapers/w l 3665 pdf (fi d . ' ' 1 ers of 
th ) · m mg that umpires express preferences toward P ay e same race . 
96 For discussion of the IA T see supra notes 8-I 0 d . ' an accompanYing text. 
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making, however, remains unclear.97 Yet that has not stopped legal 
scholars and other commentators from jumping to conclusions . The law 
review literature is  now replete with questionable extrapolations from IA T 
results to claims of pervasive discrimination against blacks and women 
throughout soci al l ife.98 
In fact, the evidence that IA T scores correlate or predict real-world 
discrimination is  remarkably thin. On gender, one paper in the literature 
purports to find an association between high scores on the IA T-indicating 
a tendency to engage in race and sex based stereotyping-and subjects ' 
wil lingness to downgrade the social skills of "agentic," competitive, 
ambitious types of female candidates for feminine-typed, but not 
masculine-typed, j obs.99 However, the researchers in that study did not 
find that the assignment of a lower score to agentic females translated into 
a lesser will ingness to hire them for any job. 100 
For race, the link between the IAT and real-world discrimination has 
l ikewise not been established. As stated by Richard Banks and his 
colleagues, there is thus far "little evidence that Race IA T scores correlate 
with discrimination against African Americans." 1 01 One unpublished 
paper, by T. Andrew Poehlman, collects studies that purport to correlate 
IA T measures w ith observable conduct. 102 However, the behaviors that are 
the focus of the existing research are far different from the types of real­
world decisions by managers, judges, and admissions officers that have 
measurable consequences for social outcomes. Rather, the studies mostly 
examine the correlation of IA T scores with such "intermediate" behaviors 
97 See, e.g. , Arkes & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 258 (implicit p
rejudice based on negative 
associations can have many different causes and mani festations); �anks
 et a I., supra note 1 2  •. at I I 8 7-
88 (stating that it i s  d i fficult  to characterize behavior as represental.lve o
f b1as). For a d1scussJon of the 
work of Hart B lanton and his  colleagues, see infra pp. 40-4 1 .  . . 
98 See e.g. K.ang supra note I I , at 1 5 1 4  (suggesting 
that implicit assocJatJOns can be assumed to 
' ' ' · Ba ·· 17 · U asures · A Behavwral Realist translate into behavior)· Jerry Kang & Mahzann R. n aJI ,  rair e . · . . . . ' " R 1 063 1 064 (2006) (lmphc1t b1as mfluence5 Revision of "Affirmative A ction, 94 CAL L. EV. , . . £ 1 · & s T Fiske Behavioral Realism rn mp oyment behavior); Linda Hami lton Krieger . usan · ' L R 997 1 03 2-33 (-2006) 
Discrimination Law· Implicit Bias and Dzsparate Treatment, 9
4 CAL · . 
EV. . '. 1 k 1c_t  · function as implicit assocJatJve ne wor s "" (cit ing the lA T for the proposition that "stereotypes can . · '  d b h e toward a h ld to perce1ve charactenze an e av subcon sc iously predispose the stereotype o er , · ") (emphasis added) stereotyped target in stereotype-i:onsJstent ways . . G d S fY e and Backlash Toward 
99 Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Gl ick, Prescnpu
ve en er tereo :.P s t 9R t I 091 
743 759 (200 1 )· see also Kang & BanaJI,  sup
ra no e . a . 
Agentic Women, 57 J .  SOC. IssUES • _ .: . rth that the !AT d i d  not correlate 1 00  t 99 at 7)6-57 ( It  lS notewo Y 
. . 
Rudman, supra no e 
fe;,ale's h i reability ratings in the feminized or the masculine joh Sign i ficantly w1th the agentlc . the work of Hart Blanton et al . ,  discussed infra pp. 
conditi ons."). For a cnl!que of th1s study, see 
l 020-2 1 . 12 t 1 1 87 (adding that "[t)he one study we 
discuss that attempted 
JOJ See Banks et a l . , supra n
h
ote . , a [of crime suspects] did not find a statis
tically s igni ficant 
to correlate lA T scores w1th s ootmg 
relationship between the two"). U d t d .  and Using the Implicit Association 
Test Ill 
1 02 And Poehlman et al n ers a
n rng 
See T. rew . . Valid
!' 32 (Sept. 1 6. 2005) (unpublished), 
availahle at 
Meta-analyszs of_ Predzcttve mA% Meta-anal s is. I 6Sep05.pdf (finding that lA T measures 
http://faculty. washmgton.edu/agg/pd 
· . Y 
perform well at predicting unconsciou
s and conscious responses). 
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as body language, eye contact, verbal communication, and friendly 
gestures towards blacks. Although easily observed in a laboratory s etting, 
these actions are of uncertain significance. As Poehlman concedes, the 
existing l iterature says vezy little about whether the lA T rel iably predicts 
hiring, job promotion, educational evaluation, police conduct, or judicial 
. 1 03 
sentencmg. 
Hart Blanton and colleagues recently reviewed the handful of 
publ ished studies that they identified as making explicit  claims about the 
value of IAT test results for predicting discriminatory behavior towards 
blacks or women.
104 With the goal of assessing the evidence for these 
claims, the authors contacted the researchers for each study and asked to 
see their data. No researchers provided a complete set, and the authors of 
only two of the papers provi ded any data at all . 1 05 
For the two papers for which data sets were actual ly provided, B lanton 
and his colleagues found that claims o f  predictive validity were 
problematic and rested on remarkably weak evidence .  Indeed, only one of 
the studies-by Zeigert and Hanges-attempted to l ink IA T results to a 
type of conduct-personnel decisions in the j ob setti ng-with legally 
cognizable consequences. The authors of that paper purported to show that 
persons scoring higher on the IA T were more l ikely to discrimi nate against 
minority j ob candidates in an experimental simulation. However, they 
observed that result only for the experimental conditi on i n  which subjects 
were expressly instructed by managers to disfavor black candidates .  In a 
race neutral condition, subjects' lA T results did  not correlate with a 
propensity to discriminate. In addition to questioning the sign ificance of a 
finding of discrimination only on express i nstructions, Blanton and 
colleagues faulted the results in that paper for other reasons, including the 
fai lure to control properly for differences among j ob candidates being 
evaluated and irregularities in the researchers ' methods for scoring the 
lAT. In sum, the Zeigert and Hanges study was j udged to be of l imited 
103 See id. at 33 (additional research is needed on lA T measures and speci fic behavior such as 
police behavior). 
I ().I See Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Va�idity 
of the Race fAT, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with Connecticut Law Review). 
The studies reviewed were: Allen R. McConnell & Jill  M. Leibold Relations among the Implici
t 
Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior. and Explicit Measur�s of Racial Altitudes 37 J. EXP�RIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001 ); Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Thin Sbces of 
Racwl Bias, 29 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV 75 (2005)· Ru"·man & �· · . r· GC· ;' Nicole Shelton . . . · , w uucK, supra no e ,,, · )· et al., frame Effects of Racial Bias during Interracial Interactions 1 6  PSYCHOL. SCI. 397 (ZOOS ' �na_th� Zeigert &_ Paul Hanges, Employment Discrimination .· Tne Role of Implicit Attitudes, ot�wn, and a Clzmatefor Racial Bias, 90 J. APPUED PSYCHOL. 5 53 (2005). . 
One researcher (McConnell) provided a full data set for the reported results but did not provJde raw lA T data Another (Z:elgert) claimed the loss of raw lA T data but provided transfonned lA T da� and data for the _other vanables reported. One researcher (Richeson) declined to provide data for th  
;suits reported lD one paper, his collaborator denied having the data for results reported in anoth
er. 
mally, the authors of the last paper (Rudman and Glick) asserted they had lost al l  the data for the 
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The other study
. 
for which Blanton and colleagues obtained data-by McConnell and Le1bold-Iooked at the relationship of subj ects ' IA T s�or�s to  the type of "intermediate" behaviors that carry uncertain s1gmficance for decisions that affect social rewards. 1 06 Conduct towards black and white experimental targets was independently assessed by two researcher-judges. "Discrimination" was defined as "avoidant" behavior 
towards b lacks, such as speaking and smil ing less often. In re-examining 
the data for thi s  paper, Blanton and colleagues found significant flaws in 
the evidence and study design. Specifically, they found that IA T scores 
significantly predicted the ratings of only one of the two judges in the 
study. Even then, the subjects ' IAT scores were not correlated 
signific antly with behavior toward the black experimenters . Instead, the 
results were driven by variations in behavior toward the white "controls ." 
More importantly, however, the overall correlation was significantly 
depen dent on a few statistical outliers, or data points that represented 
extreme, atypical results. In particular, the behavior of a small  number 
(two) of the experimental subjects masked the fundamental trend-or Jack 
thereof-in the data. When the effects of outliers were eliminated, the 
correlation between the IA T and behavior disappeared. 
This careful reassessment of the IA T research reveals that the lA T' s 
power to  predict or reveal actual discrimination is, for now, vastly 
exaggerated.  The scientific literature contains remarkably l ittle evidence 
for a rel iable l ink between IA T measures and the propensity to 
discriminate against women or protected minorities in the real world .
. 
On 
the current state of knowledge, IA T results do not support any assertiOns 
about people ' s  conscious or unconscious discriminatory behavior. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Attempts to blame disparities in social outcom_
es by race or s�x on 
unconscious bias must be approached with caution Ill _
the current c l t�ate . 
Without hard evidence, sweeping and categorical cla1ms of u nconsc1 ous 
stereotyping are unwarranted. The extent, d_
irection: mag�ttude
, and even 
existence of unconsciously motivated behavtors agamst dtsfavored groups 
b d Rather Such assertions must be demon strated. Thts cannot e assume . , . 
· 1 · the careful and oatient accumulatiOn of data, as wel l as necessan y reqmres , . . . . .: 
� rY"'�"'" r>nmnrPh 1·ve and sophisticated exammat1ons of ex tstmg .acts > loVl v uS, '-'V'"t'' _ ... enS > 
of social l ife.  
'bold a note 1 04  at 440 The behaviors assessed inc luded: 1 06 See McConnel l  & Le• ' supr · · · · · '-�-' f d · · , d leanin towards experimenters. the extent to wh1ch the suhjccts '""'� ace partiCipants forward 
bo �ness o� the participants' arms, the expressiveness of the participants arms. the expenmenter, the ope . tal federates and the subjects' chair at the end of the mtcractJon, the distance between the expenmen con · fd 4 1 R  . h h 'tat 'ons fidgeting, and extemporaneous soc1a l  comments . . at . .  sm1les, speech errors, speec es1 l • 
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In addition, many of the claims concerning unconscious b i as do not 
properly allege category-based bias at all. Rather, they are directed at the 
disparate impact, or differential effects, of category-neutral criteria .  Such 
patterns are often grounded in "supply side" differences. Existing 
disparities by race or sex in average qual ifications or human capital 
development affect behavior. These differences influence d i fferent groups ' 
overal l  abil ity to meet social requirements and comp ete for soc ial  rewards. 
Contentions sounding in disparate impact, whether imp l icat ing conscious 
or unconscious decision-making processes, should be subj ect to the types 
of scrutiny that have long been applied to such c laims :  neutral rules should 
be assessed for relevance, effi ciency and social usefulness. And even if 
such rules reflect sound generalizations, there i s  no  avoiding the need to 
decide whether the costs of eliminating differential impacts are worth the 
benefits of greater equality of outcome. 
Allegations of disparate treatment, based on the accusation that race or 
sex plays a causal role in social outcomes, should l ikew i se be scrutinized 
for potential, alternative "supply side" explanations. In part icu lar, well­
developed social scientific data indicate that factors other than 
discrimination can often explain observed group di sparities. These 
alternative possibilities should never be forgotten when considering 
unconscious bias. Finally, wariness concerning specific clai ms of 
inadvertent, as opposed to deliberate or consci ous, discrimination is 
necessary. Many behaviors attributed to unconscious bias could just as 
well be explained by old-fashioned "ration al" or "stati stical" 
discrimination. Such forms of discrimination are nothing new and research 
in cognitive psychology sheds little light on how they can best be 
addressed. ?n the whole, and contrary to dominant opin ion, a central role  
for �c?n�c1�us stereotyping i n  social life has yet to be establ ished.  The 
field IS m Its mfancy and much work remains. 
